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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Secure PUF-ASCON-Based Gateway-Assisted D2D Authentication for Resource-Constrained Smart-Manufacturing IIoT Devices

Alanoud Subahi

Mathematics · 04.08.2026 · 14 (15) · 2800

DOI: 10.3390/math14152800 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics, online erschienen am 04.08.2026. Verfasst von Alanoud Subahi. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: KAU Endowment (WAQF) at King Abdulaziz University.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Smart-manufacturing Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) deployments increasingly depend on low-latency device-to-device (D2D) communication among resource-constrained, physically exposed field devices. This setting makes mutual authentication and session-key establishment difficult: public-key-intensive or cloud-dependent schemes add overhead, availability dependence, and single points of failure, while weak PUF-based designs may expose challenge-response pairs (CRPs) to replay, disclosure, and modeling attacks. This paper proposes PASMAP, a lightweight PUF-ASCON mutual authentication protocol for gateway-assisted D2D communication in smart-manufacturing IIoT. PASMAP combines SRAM-PUF key reconstruction, fuzzy-extractor helper data, hash- and XOR-based obfuscation, and ASCON authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) to protect hardware-rooted identities, hide raw PUF responses, and establish fresh session keys for post-authentication data exchange under an explicitly trusted local-gateway model. The protocol is evaluated against physical, protocol-level, and insider threats, including cloning, tampering, replay, man-in-the-middle, CRP disclosure, PUF modeling, stolen-verifier, and known-key attacks. A real-or-random (ROR) analysis bounds the adversary’s session-key advantage using hash collisions, PUF-response prediction, online guessing, and ASCON AEAD security. A mixed-platform evaluation based on ESP32 primitive timings for the edge devices and desktop timings for the resource-rich gateway yields an estimated total computation cost of 4.762 ms. The initiator and responder require 2.006 ms/264.79 μJ and 2.679 ms/353.63 μJ of computational energy, respectively, while the five-message exchange carries 4704 bits. These results indicate low computational overhead under the stated benchmark and power-model assumptions. However, the protocol totals are operation-count-based estimates, the PUF and fuzzy-extractor operations are simulated, and the energy model excludes several platform- and communication-dependent costs. A complete embedded implementation is therefore required to validate end-to-end latency, memory use, energy consumption, communication-stack overhead, SRAM-PUF reliability, and fuzzy-extractor performance.

Förderung

  • KAU Endowment (WAQF) at King Abdulaziz University

Zitieren

APA

Subahi, A. (2026). Secure PUF-ASCON-Based Gateway-Assisted D2D Authentication for Resource-Constrained Smart-Manufacturing IIoT Devices. Mathematics, 14(15), 2800. https://doi.org/10.3390/math14152800

Vancouver

Subahi A. Secure PUF-ASCON-Based Gateway-Assisted D2D Authentication for Resource-Constrained Smart-Manufacturing IIoT Devices. Mathematics. 2026;14(15):2800. doi:10.3390/math14152800

BibTeX
@article{Subahi2026,
  author = {Subahi, Alanoud},
  title = {Secure PUF-ASCON-Based Gateway-Assisted D2D Authentication for Resource-Constrained Smart-Manufacturing IIoT Devices},
  journal = {Mathematics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {15},
  pages = {2800},
  doi = {10.3390/math14152800}
}
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