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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Strategic Choices of Carbon Trading Modes for Competing Manufacturers Under the Cap-and-Trade Policy

Xuemei Zhang, Qiang Hu, Xiao Jiang, Tingyuan Lou

Mathematics · 07.07.2026 · 14 (13) · 2441

DOI: 10.3390/math14132441 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics, online erschienen am 07.07.2026. Verfasst von Xuemei Zhang und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 81 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project of Zhejiang Province of China, The National Social Science Foundation of China, The Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Confronted with the constraints of global carbon reduction mandates and the widespread implementation of cap-and-trade (CAT) policy, competing manufacturers face critical choices in carbon quota trading, such as engaging in external markets or internal agreements. We develop a duopolistic game model comprising a low-carbon manufacturer (MG) and a traditional manufacturer (MT) under a CAT framework. In a perfect carbon quota trading market, manufacturers simultaneously cooperate and compete, facing a strategic choice between external trading through the open carbon market and internal trading agreements. We investigate how the low-carbon development level, carbon quota surplus, and internal carbon price affect their choices of carbon quota trading modes. Analytical results indicate that in the scenario where MG’s quota surplus is insufficient to fully meet MT’s demand, both manufacturers can achieve Pareto improvement in their respective profits within a certain range of internal carbon prices. Otherwise, the internal trading agreements may only guarantee an increase in their aggregate profits. A numerical analysis based on the actual situation of China’s steel industry verifies the theoretical conclusions.

Förderung

  • Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project of Zhejiang Province of China
  • The National Social Science Foundation of China
  • The Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China
  • The Scientific Research Foundation of Zhejiang Provincial Education Department of China
  • Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Zhejiang College
  • The Development Foundation of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Zhejiang College

Zitieren

APA

Zhang, X., Hu, Q., Jiang, X., & Lou, T. (2026). Strategic Choices of Carbon Trading Modes for Competing Manufacturers Under the Cap-and-Trade Policy. Mathematics, 14(13), 2441. https://doi.org/10.3390/math14132441

Vancouver

Zhang X, Hu Q, Jiang X, Lou T. Strategic Choices of Carbon Trading Modes for Competing Manufacturers Under the Cap-and-Trade Policy. Mathematics. 2026;14(13):2441. doi:10.3390/math14132441

BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
  author = {Zhang, Xuemei and Hu, Qiang and Jiang, Xiao and Lou, Tingyuan},
  title = {Strategic Choices of Carbon Trading Modes for Competing Manufacturers Under the Cap-and-Trade Policy},
  journal = {Mathematics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {13},
  pages = {2441},
  doi = {10.3390/math14132441}
}
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