VPS: A Verkle-Based Polynomial Signature Scheme with Post-Quantum Security
Mathematics · 09.06.2026 · 14 (12) · 2058
DOI: 10.3390/math14122058 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics, online erschienen am 09.06.2026. Verfasst von Maria Nutu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 24 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
With the development of large-scale quantum computers, classical cryptographic algorithms such as RSA or ECC can easily be broken by Shor’s algorithm. Consequently, the cryptography community is shifting its focus toward Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), developing primitives that are secure against both classical and quantum attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel Verkle-Polynomial Signature (VPS) scheme by combining the lattice-based polynomial commitment scheme of Cini et al. with Verkle trees and a lattice-based One-Time Signature (OTS) engine to achieve post-quantum security. We demonstrate that while sacrificing the operational efficiency and structural maturity of traditional hash-based signatures, our framework provides robust post-quantum security guarantees inherited from standard lattice assumptions.
Förderung
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Zitieren
APA
Nutu, M., Bocu, R., & Iavich, M. (2026). VPS: A Verkle-Based Polynomial Signature Scheme with Post-Quantum Security. Mathematics, 14(12), 2058. https://doi.org/10.3390/math14122058
Vancouver
Nutu M, Bocu R, Iavich M. VPS: A Verkle-Based Polynomial Signature Scheme with Post-Quantum Security. Mathematics. 2026;14(12):2058. doi:10.3390/math14122058
BibTeX
@article{Nutu2026,
author = {Nutu, Maria and Bocu, Razvan and Iavich, Maksim},
title = {VPS: A Verkle-Based Polynomial Signature Scheme with Post-Quantum Security},
journal = {Mathematics},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {12},
pages = {2058},
doi = {10.3390/math14122058}
}
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