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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model and Stability Analysis for Collaborative Innovation in Traditional Energy Enterprises

Nina Su, Shiying Jia, Yunsheng Xin

Mathematics · 03.06.2026 · 14 (11) · 1968

DOI: 10.3390/math14111968 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics, online erschienen am 03.06.2026. Verfasst von Nina Su und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Shanxi Provincial Science and Technology Strategy Research Special Project, Key Research and Development Program Project of Shanxi Province, Doctoral Research Startup Fund of Taiyuan University of Science and Technology.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This study systematically explores the underlying mechanisms of collaborative innovation driving the green transformation of traditional energy enterprises. Existing research primarily focuses on enterprise scale and overall competitiveness, rarely delving into these specific collaborative pathways. Furthermore, studies employing evolutionary game theory to analyze the tripartite relationship among the government, traditional energy, and emerging technology enterprises remain fragmented, failing to fully capture the dynamic mechanisms of multi-stakeholder strategic choices. To bridge these gaps, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model incorporating coordination costs and the benefit distribution ratio to explore their influence mechanisms. Replicator dynamics equations are employed to identify stable cooperation conditions, overcoming traditional two-party framework constraints. Additionally, MATLAB R2024b numerical simulations validate the theoretical findings. The results reveal two evolutionarily stable equilibrium points. First, higher initial willingness among participants accelerates the system’s evolution toward a stable cooperative state. Second, coordination costs induced by information asymmetry act as a core bottleneck that deters participation and risks collaborative collapse. Third, targeted government incentives and a rational benefit distribution ratio directly determine cooperation willingness; notably, enterprises adopt collaborative strategies only when this ratio falls between 0.27 and 0.69. Fourth, fair and transparent supervision is crucial for mitigating trust deficits and distribution disputes. Ultimately, scientifically designing incentives, optimizing benefit structures, promoting information sharing, and establishing robust supervision effectively facilitate a sustainable tripartite collaborative innovation pattern.

Förderung

  • Shanxi Provincial Science and Technology Strategy Research Special Project
  • Key Research and Development Program Project of Shanxi Province
  • Doctoral Research Startup Fund of Taiyuan University of Science and Technology
  • Science and Technology Project of the Department of Transport of Shanxi Province

Zitieren

APA

Su, N., Jia, S., & Xin, Y. (2026). Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model and Stability Analysis for Collaborative Innovation in Traditional Energy Enterprises. Mathematics, 14(11), 1968. https://doi.org/10.3390/math14111968

Vancouver

Su N, Jia S, Xin Y. Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model and Stability Analysis for Collaborative Innovation in Traditional Energy Enterprises. Mathematics. 2026;14(11):1968. doi:10.3390/math14111968

BibTeX
@article{Su2026,
  author = {Su, Nina and Jia, Shiying and Xin, Yunsheng},
  title = {Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model and Stability Analysis for Collaborative Innovation in Traditional Energy Enterprises},
  journal = {Mathematics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1968},
  doi = {10.3390/math14111968}
}
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