Dynamic Time-Window Nash Equilibrium Strategies for Spacecraft Pursuit–Evasion Games Under Incomplete Strategies
Machines · 02.03.2026 · 14 (3) · 280
DOI: 10.3390/machines14030280 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Machines, online erschienen am 02.03.2026. Verfasst von Lei Sun und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Defense Science, Technology and Industry Bureau Stability Support Project, National Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province of China, Aviation Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Spacecraft pursuit–evasion in contested environments is complicated by strategic incompleteness: the evader can switch maneuvering modes and deploy multi-domain countermeasures that degrade the pursuer’s perception, leading to non-stationary information and distributionally ambiguous interference statistics. A dynamic time-window Nash equilibrium framework is developed for linearized Local Vertical Local Horizontal (LVLH) relative motion under interference-induced uncertainty. Perceptual degradation is modeled via an evidence–theoretic belief representation, and the Jensen–Shannon (JS) divergence is introduced to quantify discrepancies between nominal and interference-corrupted beliefs. The divergence metric drives an adaptive time-window partitioning policy and an uncertainty-aware running cost that balances nominal performance objectives with robustness regularization during high-degradation intervals. In each time window, sufficient conditions are provided for the existence of a local Nash equilibrium, and equilibrium strategies are characterized by the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) equation. A global consistency result is established: assuming state continuity, additive cost decomposition, and dynamic-programming compatibility at window boundaries, concatenating the window-wise equilibria yields a Nash equilibrium over the entire horizon. Unlike conventional receding-horizon differential games with a fixed replanning grid, the proposed policy partitions the horizon online in response to perceptual-degradation events and stitches adjacent windows through a continuation value. This boundary stitching enables the global consistency guarantee under additive costs and state continuity. To hedge against ambiguity in interference intensity, a variational distributionally robust optimization (DRO) problem with moment-constrained ambiguity sets is formulated, and the dual worst-case distribution is derived. The resulting Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) system is reformulated as a finite-dimensional variational inequality, for which an accelerated Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) operator-splitting solver is proposed for efficient real-time computation. Numerical simulations validate the framework and demonstrate improved robustness and computational scalability under time-varying interference compared with fixed-window baselines.
Förderung
- National Defense Science, Technology and Industry Bureau Stability Support Project
- National Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province of China
- Aviation Science Foundation of China
- General Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Sun, L., Han, Z., Wang, Y., Tian, B., & Huang, P. (2026). Dynamic Time-Window Nash Equilibrium Strategies for Spacecraft Pursuit–Evasion Games Under Incomplete Strategies. Machines, 14(3), 280. https://doi.org/10.3390/machines14030280
Vancouver
Sun L, Han Z, Wang Y, Tian B, Huang P. Dynamic Time-Window Nash Equilibrium Strategies for Spacecraft Pursuit–Evasion Games Under Incomplete Strategies. Machines. 2026;14(3):280. doi:10.3390/machines14030280
BibTeX
@article{Sun2026,
author = {Sun, Lei and Han, Zengliang and Wang, Yuhui and Tian, Binpeng and Huang, Panxing},
title = {Dynamic Time-Window Nash Equilibrium Strategies for Spacecraft Pursuit–Evasion Games Under Incomplete Strategies},
journal = {Machines},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {3},
pages = {280},
doi = {10.3390/machines14030280}
}
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