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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

When Platform Private Labels Help Incumbent Sellers: The Role of Contract Unobservability

Yueyun Zhang, Shue Mei, Weijun Zhong

Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research · 12.11.2026 · 21 (11) · 422

DOI: 10.3390/jtaer21110422 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, online erschienen am 12.11.2026. Verfasst von Yueyun Zhang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Key R&D Program of China, National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Online platforms often begin as intermediaries for third-party sellers but may later introduce private-label products. We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells through a platform that can introduce its own private label. Both firms procure from upstream suppliers through contracts that may be observable or unobservable. Under observable contracts, platform entry always reduces the manufacturer’s profit. Under unobservable contracts, however, entry can benefit both firms. A private wholesale-price deviation does not induce a direct pricing response from the rival chain, strengthening suppliers’ incentives to reduce wholesale prices. When the private label is sufficiently differentiated, procurement savings and demand adjustments can outweigh the competitive pressure from entry. We further endogenize transparency and show that the manufacturer prefers nondisclosure, whereas the platform may disclose its procurement cost when competition is sufficiently intense. Extensions and sensitivity analyses examine alternative sourcing structures, product preferences, beliefs, and market conditions, clarifying the robustness and boundaries of the manufacturer’s gain from platform entry.

Förderung

  • National Key R&D Program of China
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Zhang, Y., Mei, S., & Zhong, W. (2026). When Platform Private Labels Help Incumbent Sellers: The Role of Contract Unobservability. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, 21(11), 422. https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer21110422

Vancouver

Zhang Y, Mei S, Zhong W. When Platform Private Labels Help Incumbent Sellers: The Role of Contract Unobservability. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research. 2026;21(11):422. doi:10.3390/jtaer21110422

BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
  author = {Zhang, Yueyun and Mei, Shue and Zhong, Weijun},
  title = {When Platform Private Labels Help Incumbent Sellers: The Role of Contract Unobservability},
  journal = {Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {21},
  number = {11},
  pages = {422},
  doi = {10.3390/jtaer21110422}
}
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