When Platform Private Labels Help Incumbent Sellers: The Role of Contract Unobservability
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research · 12.11.2026 · 21 (11) · 422
DOI: 10.3390/jtaer21110422 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, online erschienen am 12.11.2026. Verfasst von Yueyun Zhang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Key R&D Program of China, National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Online platforms often begin as intermediaries for third-party sellers but may later introduce private-label products. We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells through a platform that can introduce its own private label. Both firms procure from upstream suppliers through contracts that may be observable or unobservable. Under observable contracts, platform entry always reduces the manufacturer’s profit. Under unobservable contracts, however, entry can benefit both firms. A private wholesale-price deviation does not induce a direct pricing response from the rival chain, strengthening suppliers’ incentives to reduce wholesale prices. When the private label is sufficiently differentiated, procurement savings and demand adjustments can outweigh the competitive pressure from entry. We further endogenize transparency and show that the manufacturer prefers nondisclosure, whereas the platform may disclose its procurement cost when competition is sufficiently intense. Extensions and sensitivity analyses examine alternative sourcing structures, product preferences, beliefs, and market conditions, clarifying the robustness and boundaries of the manufacturer’s gain from platform entry.
Förderung
- National Key R&D Program of China
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Zhang, Y., Mei, S., & Zhong, W. (2026). When Platform Private Labels Help Incumbent Sellers: The Role of Contract Unobservability. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, 21(11), 422. https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer21110422
Vancouver
Zhang Y, Mei S, Zhong W. When Platform Private Labels Help Incumbent Sellers: The Role of Contract Unobservability. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research. 2026;21(11):422. doi:10.3390/jtaer21110422
BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
author = {Zhang, Yueyun and Mei, Shue and Zhong, Weijun},
title = {When Platform Private Labels Help Incumbent Sellers: The Role of Contract Unobservability},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {11},
pages = {422},
doi = {10.3390/jtaer21110422}
}
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