Organ Banks and Zombie Firms
Journal of Risk and Financial Management · 19.11.2026 · 19 (11) · 936
DOI: 10.3390/jrfm19110936 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Risk and Financial Management, online erschienen am 19.11.2026. Verfasst von Asli M. Colpan und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 83 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Control over a bank’s lending decisions can be separated from exposure to its lending losses. A controlling borrower may then benefit privately from having the bank prop up her firm even though the firm’s liquidation value exceeds its going concern value. We call such a bank an organ bank and such a firm a zombie firm. We present exploratory cross-economy correlational evidence associating zombie firm prevalence with the prevalence of business family-controlled banks. A simple model shows how this separation can induce the continued financing of firms an independent lender would liquidate. The distortion is larger when the controlling borrower controls the bank with a smaller cash-flow ownership stake. The model and discussion show how bank governance, related lending, and anticipated government support may contribute to the preservation of zombie firms, inefficient capital allocation, and systemic risk.
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APA
Colpan, A. M., Morck, R. K., & Yeung, B. (2026). Organ Banks and Zombie Firms. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 19(11), 936. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19110936
Vancouver
Colpan AM, Morck RK, Yeung B. Organ Banks and Zombie Firms. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2026;19(11):936. doi:10.3390/jrfm19110936
BibTeX
@article{Colpan2026,
author = {Colpan, Asli M. and Morck, Randall K. and Yeung, Bernard},
title = {Organ Banks and Zombie Firms},
journal = {Journal of Risk and Financial Management},
year = {2026},
volume = {19},
number = {11},
pages = {936},
doi = {10.3390/jrfm19110936}
}
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