The Effect of Short-Sale Restrictions on Corporate Managers
Journal of Risk and Financial Management · 17.11.2023 · 16 (11) · 486
DOI: 10.3390/jrfm16110486 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Risk and Financial Management, online erschienen am 17.11.2023. Verfasst von Baixiao Liu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies the effect of short selling on corporate managers from 2002 through 2010. We examine how the exemption of short-sale uptick tests due to the Regulation SHO pilot program affects managers’ decisions to abandon value-reducing acquisition attempts. We find that when deciding whether to abandon value-reducing acquisition attempts during the program, managers of pilot firms, whose stocks are less subject to short-selling impediments, are more sensitive to stock price changes than managers of nonpilot firms. We find no difference in managers’ sensitivity prior to nor post SHO. These results indicate that, despite their dislike of short sellers, managers believe that the level of informativeness from capital markets is superior when short sellers are less impeded.
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APA
Liu, B., McConnell, J. J., & Schrowang, A. (2023). The Effect of Short-Sale Restrictions on Corporate Managers. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 16(11), 486. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm16110486
Vancouver
Liu B, McConnell JJ, Schrowang A. The Effect of Short-Sale Restrictions on Corporate Managers. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2023;16(11):486. doi:10.3390/jrfm16110486
BibTeX
@article{Liu2023,
author = {Liu, Baixiao and McConnell, John J. and Schrowang, Andrew},
title = {The Effect of Short-Sale Restrictions on Corporate Managers},
journal = {Journal of Risk and Financial Management},
year = {2023},
volume = {16},
number = {11},
pages = {486},
doi = {10.3390/jrfm16110486}
}
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