Active Defense and Deception Technology Against Insider Threats: A Serverless and Cryptographically Verifiable Framework
Informatics · 16.11.2026 · 13 (11) · 196
DOI: 10.3390/informatics13110196 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Informatics, online erschienen am 16.11.2026. Verfasst von Licia Pia Zichella und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Traditional perimeter security models, such as the “castle-and-moat” paradigm, are structurally ineffective against insider threats—including malicious employees, compromised accounts, and external vendors—as these actors already possess legitimate credentials and traverse authorized paths. Traditional passive monitoring systems rely on retrospective access log analysis, which typically identifies data exfiltration only after it is completed. This creates a critical temporal asymmetry that is unsustainable under recent European cybersecurity regulations, such as GDPR, NIS2, and DORA, which mandate incident notification within 24 to 72 h. To bridge this gap, this paper proposes a serverless Active Defense and Deception framework tailored for cloud environments. By strategically deploying realistic, dynamically generated decoy assets (honeyfiles and honeytokens) alongside multi-format web beacons (PDF, DOCX, XLSX) and cryptographic PAdES digital signatures, the system enables real-time detection, forensic attribution, and automated, targeted remediation. We validated a prototype of the system on an emulated Amazon Web Services (AWS) infrastructure using LocalStack and Docker. Experimental results demonstrate a highly stable automated-response latency (approximately 2.16 s, measured as the time to issue the IAM revocation request in the emulated environment), a zero false positive rate (0.00%) over 500 normal traffic events, 100% recall on modeled malicious behavioral patterns, and beacon activation across all tested desktop PDF readers. The proposed framework successfully maps to the MITRE ATT&CK and D3FEND frameworks, offering a verifiable, proactive solution for corporate data protection.
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APA
Zichella, L. P., Zambetti, C., Tavilla, S., Matarrese, G., & Mongiello, M. (2026). Active Defense and Deception Technology Against Insider Threats: A Serverless and Cryptographically Verifiable Framework. Informatics, 13(11), 196. https://doi.org/10.3390/informatics13110196
Vancouver
Zichella LP, Zambetti C, Tavilla S, Matarrese G, Mongiello M. Active Defense and Deception Technology Against Insider Threats: A Serverless and Cryptographically Verifiable Framework. Informatics. 2026;13(11):196. doi:10.3390/informatics13110196
BibTeX
@article{Zichella2026,
author = {Zichella, Licia Pia and Zambetti, Camilla and Tavilla, Simone and Matarrese, Gianvito and Mongiello, Marina},
title = {Active Defense and Deception Technology Against Insider Threats: A Serverless and Cryptographically Verifiable Framework},
journal = {Informatics},
year = {2026},
volume = {13},
number = {11},
pages = {196},
doi = {10.3390/informatics13110196}
}
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