Common Institutional Ownership, Controlling Shareholders, and Earnings Management: Evidence from China
International Journal of Financial Studies · 14.11.2026 · 14 (11) · 319
DOI: 10.3390/ijfs14110319 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 14.11.2026. Verfasst von Ze Ren. Die Arbeit nennt 88 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study examines whether and how common institutional ownership (CIO) constrains earnings management in an emerging market characterized by concentrated ownership and controlling-shareholder tunneling. We find that CIO significantly reduces earnings management, particularly when ownership is more concentrated and the control–ownership wedge is larger. Further evidence shows that CIO operates through information cost reduction and monitoring, and that its effect on tunneling is partly mediated by reduced earnings management. These findings contribute to the literature by linking CIO’s financial reporting effects to the broader agency problem of controlling-shareholder expropriation and identifying the ownership and governance conditions under which its monitoring role is most effective. The findings also imply that investors can view CIO as a governance signal, regulators can facilitate effective institutional monitoring, and corporate boards can leverage CIO to strengthen financial reporting and minority shareholder protection.
Zitieren
APA
Ren, Z. (2026). Common Institutional Ownership, Controlling Shareholders, and Earnings Management: Evidence from China. International Journal of Financial Studies, 14(11), 319. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs14110319
Vancouver
Ren Z. Common Institutional Ownership, Controlling Shareholders, and Earnings Management: Evidence from China. International Journal of Financial Studies. 2026;14(11):319. doi:10.3390/ijfs14110319
BibTeX
@article{Ren2026,
author = {Ren, Ze},
title = {Common Institutional Ownership, Controlling Shareholders, and Earnings Management: Evidence from China},
journal = {International Journal of Financial Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {11},
pages = {319},
doi = {10.3390/ijfs14110319}
}
EUVIMED