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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Pricing and Quantity Decisions under Asymmetric Carbon Emission Reduction Information and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

Faqi Xie, Yushuang Deng, Huiru Chen

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · 2023

DOI: 10.3390/ijerph20031944 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2023. Verfasst von Faqi Xie und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Decision Making, Carbon. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Huanggang Normal’s University 2022 “Key Project Nurturing Plan” of the Innovative Team Project, Huanggang Normal University 2022 Think Tank Building Project.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

With the continuous spread of cap-and-trade mechanisms and consumers’ great concerns about environmental issues, manufacturers strive to reduce carbon emissions. Unfortunately, they are not always willing to disclose their accurate emission reductions or may even falsify emission reduction information. By developing a signaling model, we explore the impact of the cap-and-trade mechanism and asymmetric information on the decision-making of supply chain members composed of a manufacturer regulated by the cap-and-trade mechanism, and a retailer. As a result, we show that the low-type manufacturer has the incentive to mimic the pricing behavior of the high-type manufacturer under information asymmetry. Thus, in order to avoid this mimicry, the high-type manufacturer will distort the wholesale price. Moreover, the impact of the cap-and-trade mechanism on the manufacturer depends on the initial quotas. Only when the initial quota is in the middle range does the high-type manufacturer benefit, while the low-type manufacturer suffers. Furthermore, the low-type manufacturer tends to hide emission reduction information, while the high-type manufacturer tends to disclose the information. We also address how information asymmetry weakens the emission reduction advantages of the high-type manufacturer. However, the cap-and-trade mechanism can effectively alleviate this negative effect.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Decision MakingCarbonCosts and Cost AnalysisConsumer BehaviorCommerce

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

asymmetric informationcap-and-tradeemission reductionsignaling game

Substanzen

Carbon

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China.
  • College of Mathematics and Statistics, Huanggang Normal University, Huanggang 438000, China.

Förderung

  • Huanggang Normal’s University 2022 “Key Project Nurturing Plan” of the Innovative Team Project
  • Huanggang Normal University 2022 Think Tank Building Project

Zitieren

APA

Xie, F., Deng, Y., & Chen, H. (2023). Pricing and Quantity Decisions under Asymmetric Carbon Emission Reduction Information and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20031944

Vancouver

Xie F, Deng Y, Chen H. Pricing and Quantity Decisions under Asymmetric Carbon Emission Reduction Information and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2023. doi:10.3390/ijerph20031944

BibTeX
@article{Xie2023,
  author = {Xie, Faqi and Deng, Yushuang and Chen, Huiru},
  title = {Pricing and Quantity Decisions under Asymmetric Carbon Emission Reduction Information and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism},
  journal = {International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.3390/ijerph20031944}
}
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