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Invertibility of the Lottery Equilibrium

Sean F. Ellermeyer, Jesse A. Schwartz

Games · 02.11.2026 · 17 (6) · 61

DOI: 10.3390/g17060061 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 02.11.2026. Verfasst von Sean F. Ellermeyer und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 18 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Auction theorists have long recognized that allocation mechanisms differ not only in outcomes but also in the information they reveal. Revelation of a winner’s valuation, for example, may affect subsequent dealings with lenders, suppliers, regulators, labor unions, and other third parties. We examine the analogous question for the lottery contest with complete information and asymmetric values, in which a prize is awarded probabilistically on the basis of contestants’ efforts. We show that the equilibrium effort profile uniquely identifies the valuations of all active contestants. If information revelation to third parties carries economic consequences in contest environments, this transparency may itself have implications for equilibrium behavior.

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APA

Ellermeyer, S. F., & Schwartz, J. A. (2026). Invertibility of the Lottery Equilibrium. Games, 17(6), 61. https://doi.org/10.3390/g17060061

Vancouver

Ellermeyer SF, Schwartz JA. Invertibility of the Lottery Equilibrium. Games. 2026;17(6):61. doi:10.3390/g17060061

BibTeX
@article{Ellermeyer2026,
  author = {Ellermeyer, Sean F. and Schwartz, Jesse A.},
  title = {Invertibility of the Lottery Equilibrium},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {17},
  number = {6},
  pages = {61},
  doi = {10.3390/g17060061}
}
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