Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents
Games · 23.07.2026 · 17 (4) · 39
DOI: 10.3390/g17040039 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 23.07.2026. Verfasst von Ren Manfredi und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 34 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: European Italian Ministry of Research.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In coordination games, the distinctive presence of multiple equilibria poses a challenge to coordination, and this has led over time to the proposal of numerous determinants of the latter. In this paper, we study coordination in a repeated Stag-hunt game played by two agents who are able to learn from the outcomes of each game, but do not know the payoff matrix. By modulating their learning capabilities, we show that agents are able to coordinate on the social optimum when they learn slowly from experience and are prone to making mistakes. A comparison with the results from a recent laboratory experiment is also provided.
Förderung
- European Italian Ministry of Research
Zitieren
APA
Manfredi, R., Vilone, D., Cvetkovic, T. J., Bagnoli, F., & Guazzini, A. (2026). Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents. Games, 17(4), 39. https://doi.org/10.3390/g17040039
Vancouver
Manfredi R, Vilone D, Cvetkovic TJ, Bagnoli F, Guazzini A. Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents. Games. 2026;17(4):39. doi:10.3390/g17040039
BibTeX
@article{Manfredi2026,
author = {Manfredi, Ren and Vilone, Daniele and Cvetkovic, Tijan J. and Bagnoli, Franco and Guazzini, Andrea},
title = {Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents},
journal = {Games},
year = {2026},
volume = {17},
number = {4},
pages = {39},
doi = {10.3390/g17040039}
}
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