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Markovian Analysis of a Small Population Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Athanasios Kehagias

Games · 25.06.2026 · 17 (4) · 34

DOI: 10.3390/g17040034 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 25.06.2026. Verfasst von Athanasios Kehagias. Die Arbeit nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In this work we consider an evolutionary game in which a small population repeatedly plays the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game using the pairwise proportional imitation (PPI) revision protocol. Since we are dealing with a small population, we can explicitly formulate a Markov chain (MC) model of the evolutionary game and study its properties. In particular, we identify the absorbing states and their basins of attraction. In addition, we briefly study the replicator dynamics of the same game for the case of a large population. We find that, as the size of the population increases, the Markovian dynamics approximate the replicator dynamics.

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APA

Kehagias, A. (2026). Markovian Analysis of a Small Population Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Games, 17(4), 34. https://doi.org/10.3390/g17040034

Vancouver

Kehagias A. Markovian Analysis of a Small Population Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Games. 2026;17(4):34. doi:10.3390/g17040034

BibTeX
@article{Kehagias2026,
  author = {Kehagias, Athanasios},
  title = {Markovian Analysis of a Small Population Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {17},
  number = {4},
  pages = {34},
  doi = {10.3390/g17040034}
}
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