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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A Cooperative Pollution Control Differential Game with Randomly Switching Payoffs

Feiran Xu, Anna Tur

Games · 29.05.2026 · 17 (3) · 28

DOI: 10.3390/g17030028 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 29.05.2026. Verfasst von Feiran Xu und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study a continuous-time cooperative differential game of pollution control in which the pollution stock accumulates emissions and affects long-run welfare. The key feature is a one-time random increase in the public damage weight, interpreted as a regime shift in environmental policy, social damage assessment, or regulatory pressure. Using dynamic programming, we characterize the grand-coalition feedback solution from the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations and derive closed-form expressions for cooperative emissions, pollution dynamics, regime-specific steady states, and transition paths. Under emission caps, we construct the coalition characteristic function using a conservative worst-case benchmark for outsider behavior rather than an unlimited-pollution assumption. For payoff allocation, we derive a dynamic payment schedule that implements the Shapley allocation along the stochastic pollution path and keeps the remaining payoff consistent with the corresponding continuation game. Finally, we extend the framework to a threshold-triggered shifted-exponential switching mechanism. This extension gives a computable objective for the optimal threshold-hitting time and clarifies how the pollution threshold and switching hazard can be interpreted as policy-relevant indicators of regulatory or ecological regime change.

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APA

Xu, F., & Tur, A. (2026). A Cooperative Pollution Control Differential Game with Randomly Switching Payoffs. Games, 17(3), 28. https://doi.org/10.3390/g17030028

Vancouver

Xu F, Tur A. A Cooperative Pollution Control Differential Game with Randomly Switching Payoffs. Games. 2026;17(3):28. doi:10.3390/g17030028

BibTeX
@article{Xu2026,
  author = {Xu, Feiran and Tur, Anna},
  title = {A Cooperative Pollution Control Differential Game with Randomly Switching Payoffs},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {17},
  number = {3},
  pages = {28},
  doi = {10.3390/g17030028}
}
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