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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach to the Inverse Eigenvector Centrality Problem

Mauro Passacantando, Fabio Raciti

Games · 07.04.2026 · 17 (2) · 20

DOI: 10.3390/g17020020 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 07.04.2026. Verfasst von Mauro Passacantando und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: European Union—Next Generation EU, University of Catania.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Eigenvector-based centrality captures recursive notions of importance in networks. While the direct problem computes centrality from given edge weights, the inverse eigenvector centrality problem seeks edge weights that reproduce a prescribed centrality profile; for directed multigraphs, this inverse task is typically non-unique and depends on the admissible arc structure. We study the direct and inverse problems on directed multigraphs and derive an explicit linear characterization of the set of admissible edge-weight vectors that are compatible with a given centrality target. On this feasible set, we formulate a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared centrality constraints, in which multiple agents select edge weights to maximize economically interpretable payoffs that incorporate arc-level competition effects. We provide conditions under which the induced game admits a concave potential function, yielding equilibrium existence and, under standard strict concavity assumptions, uniqueness. Finally, we illustrate the model on an airport network where nodes represent airports and parallel arcs represent airline-specific routes, showing that equilibrium selection produces a feasible and interpretable weight configuration that preserves the prescribed centrality.

Förderung

  • European Union—Next Generation EU
  • University of Catania

Zitieren

APA

Passacantando, M., & Raciti, F. (2026). A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach to the Inverse Eigenvector Centrality Problem. Games, 17(2), 20. https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020020

Vancouver

Passacantando M, Raciti F. A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach to the Inverse Eigenvector Centrality Problem. Games. 2026;17(2):20. doi:10.3390/g17020020

BibTeX
@article{Passacantando2026,
  author = {Passacantando, Mauro and Raciti, Fabio},
  title = {A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach to the Inverse Eigenvector Centrality Problem},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {17},
  number = {2},
  pages = {20},
  doi = {10.3390/g17020020}
}
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