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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number

Iwan Bos, Marco A. Marini

Games · 29.12.2022 · 14 (1) · 3

DOI: 10.3390/g14010003 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 29.12.2022. Verfasst von Iwan Bos und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, Edgard Milhaud Foundation, Liège, Belgium.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper examines a homogeneous-good Bertrand–Edgeworth oligopoly model to explore the role of firm size and number in pricing. We consider the price impact of merger, break up, investment, divestment, entry and exit. A merger leads to higher prices only when it increases the size of the largest seller and industry capacity is neither too big nor too small post-merger. Similarly, breaking up a firm only leads to lower prices when it concerns the biggest producer and aggregate capacity is within an intermediate range. Investment and entry (weakly) reduce prices, whereas divestment and exit yield (weakly) higher prices. Taken together, these findings suggest that size matters more than number in the determination of oligopoly prices.

Förderung

  • Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
  • Edgard Milhaud Foundation, Liège, Belgium

Zitieren

APA

Bos, I., & Marini, M. A. (2022). Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number. Games, 14(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010003

Vancouver

Bos I, Marini MA. Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number. Games. 2022;14(1):3. doi:10.3390/g14010003

BibTeX
@article{Bos2022,
  author = {Bos, Iwan and Marini, Marco A.},
  title = {Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {14},
  number = {1},
  pages = {3},
  doi = {10.3390/g14010003}
}
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