Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number
Games · 29.12.2022 · 14 (1) · 3
DOI: 10.3390/g14010003 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 29.12.2022. Verfasst von Iwan Bos und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, Edgard Milhaud Foundation, Liège, Belgium.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines a homogeneous-good Bertrand–Edgeworth oligopoly model to explore the role of firm size and number in pricing. We consider the price impact of merger, break up, investment, divestment, entry and exit. A merger leads to higher prices only when it increases the size of the largest seller and industry capacity is neither too big nor too small post-merger. Similarly, breaking up a firm only leads to lower prices when it concerns the biggest producer and aggregate capacity is within an intermediate range. Investment and entry (weakly) reduce prices, whereas divestment and exit yield (weakly) higher prices. Taken together, these findings suggest that size matters more than number in the determination of oligopoly prices.
Förderung
- Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
- Edgard Milhaud Foundation, Liège, Belgium
Zitieren
APA
Bos, I., & Marini, M. A. (2022). Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number. Games, 14(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010003
Vancouver
Bos I, Marini MA. Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number. Games. 2022;14(1):3. doi:10.3390/g14010003
BibTeX
@article{Bos2022,
author = {Bos, Iwan and Marini, Marco A.},
title = {Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number},
journal = {Games},
year = {2022},
volume = {14},
number = {1},
pages = {3},
doi = {10.3390/g14010003}
}
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