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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities

Sarina Steinmann, Ralph Winkler

Games · 15.05.2019 · 10 (2) · 23

DOI: 10.3390/g10020023 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 15.05.2019. Verfasst von Sarina Steinmann und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 14 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung : 154404.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents’ participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model.

Förderung

  • Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung : 154404

Zitieren

APA

Steinmann, S., & Winkler, R. (2019). Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities. Games, 10(2), 23. https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023

Vancouver

Steinmann S, Winkler R. Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities. Games. 2019;10(2):23. doi:10.3390/g10020023

BibTeX
@article{Steinmann2019,
  author = {Steinmann, Sarina and Winkler, Ralph},
  title = {Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {10},
  number = {2},
  pages = {23},
  doi = {10.3390/g10020023}
}
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