EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Understanding the Complex Adaptive Characteristics of Cross-Regional Emergency Collaboration in China: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Approach

Jida Liu, Changqi Dong

Fractal and Fractional · 05.02.2024 · 8 (2) · 98

DOI: 10.3390/fractalfract8020098 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Fractal and Fractional, online erschienen am 05.02.2024. Verfasst von Jida Liu und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 26-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Regional integration and pairing assistance are two forms of cross-regional emergency collaboration practice carried out by the Chinese government. Based on the Chinese government’s emergency management practice, evolutionary game models of cross-regional emergency collaboration were constructed. Further, the traditional evolutionary game model was improved by introducing the stochastic process, and Gaussian white noise was introduced as a random disturbance. The stochastic evolutionary game model was constructed, and the existence and stability of the equilibrium solutions of the two kinds of stochastic evolutionary game systems for cross-regional emergency collaboration were verified based on the stability discrimination theorem of stochastic differential equations. We used numerical simulations to simulate the evolution trajectories of the regional integration and the pairing assistance stochastic evolutionary game system. In the regional integration game system, when the efficiency of emergency collaboration, the emergency capital stock, and the externality coefficients are higher, positive emergency strategies are more likely to become the stable state of the game subjects’ strategy selection. In the pairing assistance game system, the efficiency of emergency collaboration, the rewards and benefits from the central government, and the matching degree between governments all had positive effects on the formation of the positive emergency strategies of the game subjects. In addition, the pairing assistance mechanism for sustainable development requires external support from the central government.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Liu, J., & Dong, C. (2024). Understanding the Complex Adaptive Characteristics of Cross-Regional Emergency Collaboration in China: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Approach. Fractal and Fractional, 8(2), 98. https://doi.org/10.3390/fractalfract8020098

Vancouver

Liu J, Dong C. Understanding the Complex Adaptive Characteristics of Cross-Regional Emergency Collaboration in China: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Approach. Fractal and Fractional. 2024;8(2):98. doi:10.3390/fractalfract8020098

BibTeX
@article{Liu2024,
  author = {Liu, Jida and Dong, Changqi},
  title = {Understanding the Complex Adaptive Characteristics of Cross-Regional Emergency Collaboration in China: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Approach},
  journal = {Fractal and Fractional},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {8},
  number = {2},
  pages = {98},
  doi = {10.3390/fractalfract8020098}
}
Kostenlos starten →