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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Mapping Web Privacy in Ecuador: A Traceable Repeated- Measurement Study of Tracking, Fingerprinting, Third-Party Dependencies, and LOPDP Implications

Leandro Pazmiño-Ortiz, Fernando Vinicio Becerra Camacho

Future Internet · 12.11.2026 · 18 (11) · 623

DOI: 10.3390/fi18110623 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Future Internet, online erschienen am 12.11.2026. Verfasst von Leandro Pazmiño-Ortiz und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 18 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Escuela Politécnica Nacional.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Single observations can mischaracterize dynamic web tracking and browser fingerprinting. We measured privacy- and security-relevant indicators across a fixed, purposively curated frame of 947 Ecuador-associated organizational domains using Blacklight on 25 June, 25 July, and 25 August 2026. A completion-aware Playwright pipeline preserved the original JSON artifacts, acquisition provenance, SHA-256 hashes, quality-control results, and contextual taxonomy. Successful JSON export rates were 58.0%, 55.8%, and 59.0%; 500 domains succeeded in all three rounds, 497 satisfied measurement-level quality control in all three rounds, and the strict repeated-measures panel contained 381 domains (40.2% of the target frame) after the contextual-classification-confidence criterion was applied. Within the strict panel, six primary binary indicators varied by less than one percentage point, and none changed significantly after Holm correction (all adjusted p≥0.812); three-round exact agreement was 96.6–99.5%. The 497-domain sensitivity analysis produced closely similar results. Attrition was sector-dependent, so the strict panel is a complete-case analytical population rather than a compositionally representative subset of the original frame. A prospective direct-browser runtime-corroboration campaign on 120 stratified domains yielded 118 Firefox artifacts and 109 quality-valid observations, independently recording third-party domains, cookies, CSP headers, tracker-list matches, and fingerprinting-relevant API activity. Because contemporaneous Blacklight artifacts were not collected, this branch provides runtime corroboration rather than paired accuracy validation. The findings support traceable short-window audit prioritization and repeated-measures inference, but they do not establish national prevalence, long-term website stability, or domain-specific LOPDP violations.

Förderung

  • Escuela Politécnica Nacional

Zitieren

APA

Pazmiño-Ortiz, L., & Camacho, F. V. B. (2026). Mapping Web Privacy in Ecuador: A Traceable Repeated- Measurement Study of Tracking, Fingerprinting, Third-Party Dependencies, and LOPDP Implications. Future Internet, 18(11), 623. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi18110623

Vancouver

Pazmiño-Ortiz L, Camacho FVB. Mapping Web Privacy in Ecuador: A Traceable Repeated- Measurement Study of Tracking, Fingerprinting, Third-Party Dependencies, and LOPDP Implications. Future Internet. 2026;18(11):623. doi:10.3390/fi18110623

BibTeX
@article{PazmioOrtiz2026,
  author = {Pazmiño-Ortiz, Leandro and Camacho, Fernando Vinicio Becerra},
  title = {Mapping Web Privacy in Ecuador: A Traceable Repeated- Measurement Study of Tracking, Fingerprinting, Third-Party Dependencies, and LOPDP Implications},
  journal = {Future Internet},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {11},
  pages = {623},
  doi = {10.3390/fi18110623}
}
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