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Interest Flooding Attacks in Named Data Networking and Mitigations: Recent Advances and Challenges

Simeon Ogunbunmi, Yu Chen, Qi Zhao, Deeraj Nagothu, Sixiao Wei, Genshe Chen, Erik Blasch

Future Internet · 06.08.2025 · 17 (8) · 357

DOI: 10.3390/fi17080357 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Future Internet, online erschienen am 06.08.2025. Verfasst von Simeon Ogunbunmi und 6 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Navy.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Named Data Networking (NDN) represents a promising Information-Centric Networking architecture that addresses limitations of traditional host-centric Internet protocols by emphasizing content names rather than host addresses for communication. While NDN offers advantages in content distribution, mobility support, and built-in security features, its stateful forwarding plane introduces significant vulnerabilities, particularly Interest Flooding Attacks (IFAs). These IFA attacks exploit the Pending Interest Table (PIT) by injecting malicious interest packets for non-existent or unsatisfiable content, leading to resource exhaustion and denial-of-service attacks against legitimate users. This survey examines research advances in IFA detection and mitigation from 2013 to 2024, analyzing seven relevant published detection and mitigation strategies to provide current insights into this evolving security challenge. We establish a taxonomy of attack variants, including Fake Interest, Unsatisfiable Interest, Interest Loop, and Collusive models, while examining their operational characteristics and network performance impacts. Our analysis categorizes defense mechanisms into five primary approaches: rate-limiting strategies, PIT management techniques, machine learning and artificial intelligence methods, reputation-based systems, and blockchain-enabled solutions. These approaches are evaluated for their effectiveness, computational requirements, and deployment feasibility. The survey extends to domain-specific implementations in resource-constrained environments, examining adaptations for Internet of Things deployments, wireless sensor networks, and high-mobility vehicular scenarios. Five critical research directions are proposed: adaptive defense mechanisms against sophisticated attackers, privacy-preserving detection techniques, real-time optimization for edge computing environments, standardized evaluation frameworks, and hybrid approaches combining multiple mitigation strategies.

Förderung

  • Navy

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APA

Ogunbunmi, S., Chen, Y., Zhao, Q., Nagothu, D., Wei, S., Chen, G., & Blasch, E. (2025). Interest Flooding Attacks in Named Data Networking and Mitigations: Recent Advances and Challenges. Future Internet, 17(8), 357. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi17080357

Vancouver

Ogunbunmi S, Chen Y, Zhao Q, Nagothu D, Wei S, Chen G, et al. Interest Flooding Attacks in Named Data Networking and Mitigations: Recent Advances and Challenges. Future Internet. 2025;17(8):357. doi:10.3390/fi17080357

BibTeX
@article{Ogunbunmi2025,
  author = {Ogunbunmi, Simeon and Chen, Yu and Zhao, Qi and Nagothu, Deeraj and Wei, Sixiao and Chen, Genshe and Blasch, Erik},
  title = {Interest Flooding Attacks in Named Data Networking and Mitigations: Recent Advances and Challenges},
  journal = {Future Internet},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {17},
  number = {8},
  pages = {357},
  doi = {10.3390/fi17080357}
}
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