Trading and Settlement Methods for Full Participation of New Energy in the Spot Market Under China’s Mechanism Price Policy
Energies · 27.07.2026 · 19 (15) · 3529
DOI: 10.3390/en19153529 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Energies, online erschienen am 27.07.2026. Verfasst von Haitao Huang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 18 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Facing China’s complex operating environment, in which the spot electricity market is still at an early stage of development and the mechanism price policy for new energy is implemented in parallel, this paper addresses the mechanism adaptability challenges that arise when high-proportion new energy participates in the spot electricity market on a full-volume basis. A trading and settlement mechanism with trading flexibility, multi-timescale coordination, and policy alignment is then constructed. Full-volume electricity on both the generation and consumption sides is incorporated into spot market clearing and settlement, thereby strengthening the role of the spot market in resource allocation. Differentiated bidding, settlement, and responsibility-bearing mechanisms are further designed according to electricity type and participant category, thereby clarifying responsibility boundaries and supporting imbalance-fund allocation. A multi-timescale trading mechanism is constructed to link short-cycle flexible trading, day-ahead bidding, intraday rolling adjustment, and real-time balancing. In addition, a differentiated medium- and long-term contract mechanism and a secondary settlement system are designed to meet the needs of system peak-regulation and market risk management. These designs also support coordination with the mechanism price policy for new energy, priority generation of hydropower and nuclear power, guaranteed electricity consumption, and grid-company agency purchasing. Case studies show that the proposed mechanism can help mitigate market efficiency distortions, improve the adaptability of the spot market to high-proportion new energy, and support the reasonable allocation of policy-related compensation costs and system regulation costs.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Huang, H., Ye, Y., & Hu, N. (2026). Trading and Settlement Methods for Full Participation of New Energy in the Spot Market Under China’s Mechanism Price Policy. Energies, 19(15), 3529. https://doi.org/10.3390/en19153529
Vancouver
Huang H, Ye Y, Hu N. Trading and Settlement Methods for Full Participation of New Energy in the Spot Market Under China’s Mechanism Price Policy. Energies. 2026;19(15):3529. doi:10.3390/en19153529
BibTeX
@article{Huang2026,
author = {Huang, Haitao and Ye, Yunlong and Hu, Ning},
title = {Trading and Settlement Methods for Full Participation of New Energy in the Spot Market Under China’s Mechanism Price Policy},
journal = {Energies},
year = {2026},
volume = {19},
number = {15},
pages = {3529},
doi = {10.3390/en19153529}
}
EUVIMED