Dynamic Bilevel Optimization of Market Participation and Strategic Bidding in Renewable-Dominated Electricity Markets
Energies · 04.03.2026 · 19 (5) · 1285
DOI: 10.3390/en19051285 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Energies, online erschienen am 04.03.2026. Verfasst von Yizhe Wang und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Science and Technology Project of State Grid Corporation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study advances a hierarchical bilevel optimization paradigm to rigorously characterize the intertwined processes of strategic bidding and regulatory market participation in electricity systems increasingly dominated by renewable resources. At the upper tier, a central regulatory authority orchestrates participation rules, renewable integration mandates, and incentive mechanisms with the overarching aim of maximizing system-wide social welfare while driving decarbonization and reliability objectives. At the subordinate level, profit-maximizing generation firms—each managing heterogeneous renewable portfolios—pursue strategic bidding under deep uncertainty, conceptualized as a multi-agent game governed by imperfect and asymmetric information. The interaction between these tiers is formalized as a bilevel Stackelberg game that encapsulates price-responsive demand, intertemporal reserve adequacy, and policy-driven incentive structures. To ensure both computational tractability and robustness against strategic indeterminacy, the lower-level equilibrium is reformulated into a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), enabling a hybrid solution procedure that combines penalty-based regularization with exact decomposition algorithms. The framework’s efficacy is validated through a stylized multi-zone case study featuring diverse renewable assets and strategic participants, revealing how policy signals, capacity ceilings, and market power asymmetries reshape efficiency frontiers and bidding equilibria. A set of high-resolution post-processing visualizations is further employed to illustrate the dynamic evolution of marginal prices, equilibrium trajectories, and regulatory impacts under uncertainty.
Förderung
- Science and Technology Project of State Grid Corporation of China
Zitieren
APA
Wang, Y., Pan, M., Qi, X., Liu, J., Wang, Y., & Ju, L. (2026). Dynamic Bilevel Optimization of Market Participation and Strategic Bidding in Renewable-Dominated Electricity Markets. Energies, 19(5), 1285. https://doi.org/10.3390/en19051285
Vancouver
Wang Y, Pan M, Qi X, Liu J, Wang Y, Ju L. Dynamic Bilevel Optimization of Market Participation and Strategic Bidding in Renewable-Dominated Electricity Markets. Energies. 2026;19(5):1285. doi:10.3390/en19051285
BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
author = {Wang, Yizhe and Pan, Miao and Qi, Xin and Liu, Junxi and Wang, Yifan and Ju, Liwei},
title = {Dynamic Bilevel Optimization of Market Participation and Strategic Bidding in Renewable-Dominated Electricity Markets},
journal = {Energies},
year = {2026},
volume = {19},
number = {5},
pages = {1285},
doi = {10.3390/en19051285}
}
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