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Topology-Aware Hierarchical Attack Graph Optimization for Cyber-Physical Power Systems

Mohamed Massaoudi, Thejas G.S., Maymouna Ez Eddin, Katherine R. Davis

Electronics · 06.07.2026 · 15 (13) · 2947

DOI: 10.3390/electronics15132947 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Electronics, online erschienen am 06.07.2026. Verfasst von Mohamed Massaoudi und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: U.S. Department of Energy.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Cyber-physical power systems face multi-stage attacks that exploit both communication-network topology and power-grid interdependencies to reach critical substations from low-security entry points. Attack graphs systematically enumerate multi-step attack paths. However, existing approaches either ignore physical network topology or separate attack-graph construction from defense placement, limiting operational usefulness. This paper presents an enhanced topology-aware greedy (TAG) framework that couples source-to-critical attack-path search with dual-mode cyber defense and explicit cyber-physical interdependency modeling. A hierarchical attack graph is constructed directly on the physical network graph, encoding compromise probabilities conditioned on both cyber vulnerability profiles and power-grid criticality. TAG employs topology-aware candidate screening, deterministic probabilistic propagation, beam search, and one-swap local refinement, followed by a dual-mode defense package combining node hardening, micro-segmentation, and monitored-neighbor shielding. Monte Carlo experiments on the 179-bus medium-voltage feeder, IEEE 39-bus New England, IEEE 118-bus, and RTS-96 benchmarks demonstrate that TAG reduces critical-reach probability by 54.3–82.0% versus no-defense baselines (mean 70.5%), and by 30.2–51.5% versus vanilla greedy placement. A cyber-physical impact-weighted risk analysis further shows that TAG’s structural defense placement yields proportional reductions in power-flow-consequence-weighted risk. Parameter sensitivity across the segmentation/containment factor η∈[0.30,0.80] and the monitored-neighbor shielding factor ρ∈[0.05,0.30] confirms robust method superiority (68–72% risk reduction across all tested values).

Förderung

  • U.S. Department of Energy

Zitieren

APA

Massaoudi, M., G.S., T., Eddin, M. E., & Davis, K. R. (2026). Topology-Aware Hierarchical Attack Graph Optimization for Cyber-Physical Power Systems. Electronics, 15(13), 2947. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15132947

Vancouver

Massaoudi M, G.S. T, Eddin ME, Davis KR. Topology-Aware Hierarchical Attack Graph Optimization for Cyber-Physical Power Systems. Electronics. 2026;15(13):2947. doi:10.3390/electronics15132947

BibTeX
@article{Massaoudi2026,
  author = {Massaoudi, Mohamed and G.S., Thejas and Eddin, Maymouna Ez and Davis, Katherine R.},
  title = {Topology-Aware Hierarchical Attack Graph Optimization for Cyber-Physical Power Systems},
  journal = {Electronics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {15},
  number = {13},
  pages = {2947},
  doi = {10.3390/electronics15132947}
}
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