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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

CertiFlash: A Cryptographic Framework for Secure Firmware and Logic Updates in SCADA and Industrial IoT Networks

Pruthviraj Pawar, Gregory Epiphaniou

Electronics · 24.06.2026 · 15 (13) · 2780

DOI: 10.3390/electronics15132780 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Electronics, online erschienen am 24.06.2026. Verfasst von Pruthviraj Pawar und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Across the world’s electrical substations, water-treatment plants, and manufacturing lines, a single engineer with valid credentials and a laptop can today push new control logic to a programmable logic controller (PLC) and change the physical behaviors of safety-critical equipment within minutes. Firmware and ladder-logic updates on SCADA and industrial IoT systems are privileged operations: an attacker installing a malicious update controls the physical process. Existing protections concentrate install authority in a single party with no externally verifiable record; compromise of the vendor key, the engineering workstation, or any operator credential suffices to deliver an attacker-chosen payload to a PLC. CertiFlash binds every update to four independent approvals: a vendor signature, a FROST-Ed25519 threshold signature from an operator quorum, a per-session nonce from the PLC, and a monotonic counter. Every decision is recorded in an append-only Merkle transparency log. The PLC verifies the aggregate with a standard RFC 8032 Ed25519 verifier, requiring no FROST-specific device code. Four security properties (authenticity, authorization, rollback resistance, auditability) are machine-checked in Tamarin under a Dolev–Yao adversary with up to t − 1 compromised operators and corroborated through ten attack scenarios. The implementation runs with concurrent Modbus TCP and Siemens S7 traffic, blocks all attacks, signs in 27–192 ms (k = 3–10), keeps ML-DSA-65 within 6% of Ed25519 from 1 KiB to 10 MiB, and sustains 30.1 updates/s on 100 PLCs. The operator-quorum signature remains FROST-Ed25519: the design is partially post-quantum in the evaluated version. The framework maps to IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.4 and NIS2 Article 21(2)(d–e).

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APA

Pawar, P., & Epiphaniou, G. (2026). CertiFlash: A Cryptographic Framework for Secure Firmware and Logic Updates in SCADA and Industrial IoT Networks. Electronics, 15(13), 2780. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15132780

Vancouver

Pawar P, Epiphaniou G. CertiFlash: A Cryptographic Framework for Secure Firmware and Logic Updates in SCADA and Industrial IoT Networks. Electronics. 2026;15(13):2780. doi:10.3390/electronics15132780

BibTeX
@article{Pawar2026,
  author = {Pawar, Pruthviraj and Epiphaniou, Gregory},
  title = {CertiFlash: A Cryptographic Framework for Secure Firmware and Logic Updates in SCADA and Industrial IoT Networks},
  journal = {Electronics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {15},
  number = {13},
  pages = {2780},
  doi = {10.3390/electronics15132780}
}
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