CPace Protocol—From the Perspective of Malicious Cryptography
Electronics · 25.08.2025 · 14 (17) · 3382
DOI: 10.3390/electronics14173382 ↗Kurz gefasst
Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift Electronics, online erschienen am 25.08.2025. Verfasst von Mirosław Kutyłowski und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The CPace protocol (Internet-Draft:draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace-14) is a password-authenticated key exchange optimized for simplicity. In particular, it involves only two messages exchanged in an arbitrary order. CPace combines a simple and elegant design with privacy guarantees obtained via strict mathematical proofs. In this paper, we go further and analyze its resilience against malicious cryptography implementations. While the clever design of CPace immediately eliminates many kleptographic techniques applicable to many other protocols of this kind, we point to the remaining risks related to kleptographic setups. We show that such attacks can break the security and privacy features of CPace. Thereby, we point to the necessity of very careful certification of the devices running CPace, focusing in particular on critical threats related to random number generators.
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APA
Kutyłowski, M., Kubiak, P., & Kostkiewicz, P. (2025). CPace Protocol—From the Perspective of Malicious Cryptography. Electronics, 14(17), 3382. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14173382
Vancouver
Kutyłowski M, Kubiak P, Kostkiewicz P. CPace Protocol—From the Perspective of Malicious Cryptography. Electronics. 2025;14(17):3382. doi:10.3390/electronics14173382
BibTeX
@article{Kutyowski2025,
author = {Kutyłowski, Mirosław and Kubiak, Przemysław and Kostkiewicz, Paweł},
title = {CPace Protocol—From the Perspective of Malicious Cryptography},
journal = {Electronics},
year = {2025},
volume = {14},
number = {17},
pages = {3382},
doi = {10.3390/electronics14173382}
}
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