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StudienprotokollOpen Access · CC BY 4.0

Attacking IEC 61850 Substations by Targeting the PTP Protocol

Aida Akbarzadeh, Laszlo Erdodi, Siv Hilde Houmb, Tore Geir Soltvedt, Hans Kristian Muggerud

Electronics · 08.06.2023 · 12 (12) · 2596

DOI: 10.3390/electronics12122596 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift Electronics, online erschienen am 08.06.2023. Verfasst von Aida Akbarzadeh und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 54 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Research Council of Norway.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Digital substations, also referred to as modern power grid substations, utilize the IEC 61850 station and process bus in conjunction with IP-based communication. This includes communication with switch yard equipment within the substation as well as the dispatch center. IEC 61850 is a global standard developed to standardize power grid communications, covering multiple communication needs related to modern power grid substations or digital substations. Unlike the legacy communication standards, IEC 60870-5-104 and DNP3, IEC 61850 is specifically designed for IP-based communication. It comprises several communication models and supports real-time communication by introducing the process bus to replace traditional peer-to-peer communication with standard network communication between substation equipment and the switch yard. The process bus, especially Sampled Measured Values (SMV) communication, in modern power grid substations relies on extremely accurate and synchronized time to prevent equipment damage, maintain power grid system balance, and ensure safety. In IEC 61850, time synchronization is provided by the Precision Time Protocol (PTP). This paper discusses the significance and challenges of time synchronization in IEC 61850 substations, particularly those associated with PTP. It presents the results of a controlled experiment that subjects time synchronization and PTP to cyber-attacks and discusses the potential consequences of such attacks. The paper also provides recommendations for potential mitigation strategies. The contribution of this paper is to provide insights and recommendations for enhancing the security of IEC 61850-based substations against cyber-attacks targeting time synchronization. The paper also explores the potential consequences of cyber-attacks and provides recommendations for potential mitigation strategies.

Förderung

  • Research Council of Norway

Zitieren

APA

Akbarzadeh, A., Erdodi, L., Houmb, S. H., Soltvedt, T. G., & Muggerud, H. K. (2023). Attacking IEC 61850 Substations by Targeting the PTP Protocol. Electronics, 12(12), 2596. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12122596

Vancouver

Akbarzadeh A, Erdodi L, Houmb SH, Soltvedt TG, Muggerud HK. Attacking IEC 61850 Substations by Targeting the PTP Protocol. Electronics. 2023;12(12):2596. doi:10.3390/electronics12122596

BibTeX
@article{Akbarzadeh2023,
  author = {Akbarzadeh, Aida and Erdodi, Laszlo and Houmb, Siv Hilde and Soltvedt, Tore Geir and Muggerud, Hans Kristian},
  title = {Attacking IEC 61850 Substations by Targeting the PTP Protocol},
  journal = {Electronics},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {12},
  number = {12},
  pages = {2596},
  doi = {10.3390/electronics12122596}
}
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