Cyber-Resilient Dynamic EV Hosting-Capacity Control Against False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Distribution Systems
Electricity · 13.11.2026 · 7 (4) · 146
DOI: 10.3390/electricity7040146 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Electricity, online erschienen am 13.11.2026. Verfasst von Pantree Khompittaya und 7 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Dynamic hosting-capacity control lets electric vehicle (EV) charging stations use the voltage headroom of distribution feeders. Because charging power is set from voltage measurements, a false data injection attack (FDIA) that inflates the reported voltage makes the controller over-allocate power and drives the real voltage below its limit. This paper models the closed loop of measurement, estimation, control and feeder for a 0.6 MW station on the IEEE 33-bus system and proposes a physics-informed defense: a consistency test between the controller’s voltage and a reconstruction built only from protected substation measurements, the station’s revenue meter and load forecasts. For attacks confined to the field-meter set and chosen independently of the measurement noise, invariance to the attack allocation follows by design because the trusted reconstruction has zero gain from those field meters. Under the nominal 10% load pseudo-measurement uncertainty and the protected-meter noise levels used in the case study, the layered detector identifies 70–95% of stealthy 0.0075 p.u. attacks, against 34–66% for conventional residual-based detectors; over 30 simulated days, it cuts daily under-voltage time from about 180 min to 2–8 min for injections of 0.01 p.u. or more. This detection resolution degrades as forecast or protected-anchor uncertainty increases. A supervised neural classifier matches it only on attacks it was trained on and is fully evaded by a model-aware attacker. A detector-aware attacker (A4) evades the PI alarm on 96–98% of attacked steps; resilience in that case comes primarily from the adaptive safety margin rather than from detection itself, at a cost of 5.5–7.2% of EV energy. Because the trusted-reconstruction error has unbounded Gaussian tails, the resulting safety bound is probabilistic rather than absolute. Model bias must be removed by offset re-estimation; noisier protected meters reduce detection power. The reported evidence is simulation-based and should be interpreted as proof-of-concept validation pending hardware-in-the-loop and field-data evaluation.
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APA
Khompittaya, P., Phanrattanachai, K., Prabpal, P., Sonasang, S., Angkawisittpan, N., Chooseang, T., Songthong, Y., & Wongpatsa, D. (2026). Cyber-Resilient Dynamic EV Hosting-Capacity Control Against False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Distribution Systems. Electricity, 7(4), 146. https://doi.org/10.3390/electricity7040146
Vancouver
Khompittaya P, Phanrattanachai K, Prabpal P, Sonasang S, Angkawisittpan N, Chooseang T, et al. Cyber-Resilient Dynamic EV Hosting-Capacity Control Against False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Distribution Systems. Electricity. 2026;7(4):146. doi:10.3390/electricity7040146
BibTeX
@article{Khompittaya2026,
author = {Khompittaya, Pantree and Phanrattanachai, Kritphon and Prabpal, Prakasit and Sonasang, Somchat and Angkawisittpan, Niwat and Chooseang, Thananan and Songthong, Yanapat and Wongpatsa, Decha},
title = {Cyber-Resilient Dynamic EV Hosting-Capacity Control Against False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Distribution Systems},
journal = {Electricity},
year = {2026},
volume = {7},
number = {4},
pages = {146},
doi = {10.3390/electricity7040146}
}
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