EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Evolutionary Game-Theory for Decision Making in Maritime Transport Under Multiple Contradictory Goals

Yuri Alexandre Meyer, Rafael Henrique de de Oliveira, Pedro Coelho Terossi, Rokaya Lassoued, Roberta Regina Delboni, João Gilberto Mendes dos Reis, Vivian Honorato Fonseca Chinelatto, Serge Galam

Entropy · 11.11.2026 · 28 (11) · 1244

DOI: 10.3390/e28111244 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Entropy, online erschienen am 11.11.2026. Verfasst von Yuri Alexandre Meyer und 7 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Sanctions, interdiction, and intensified monitoring can alter the routes used in maritime transport. This study examines how increasing enforcement intensity affects maritime routing in the long run and over finite adaptation horizons. A three-strategy evolutionary game represents short, intermediate, and long routes through population shares governed by replicator dynamics. Enforcement intensity enters as an external parameter. The analysis identifies regime boundaries at which the payoff ordering of competing routes changes. In the reference scenario, the short route loses payoff dominance at λc=0.275 and the long route becomes dominant above λML≃0.367, producing a sequential reorganization from short to intermediate and long routes as enforcement pressure increases. An indirect-routing share and its sensitivity measure the finite-time response alongside the long-run payoff thresholds. Numerical simulations show gradual adjustment toward payoff-dominant strategies. With symmetric initial shares and T=20, sensitivity peaks at λ*=0.2457, below the first payoff threshold; its location depends on the horizon and initial composition. A complementary static strategic formulation identifies conditions under which active enforcement becomes preferable to passive monitoring as a function of route-specific interdiction risk. The predictions are conditional on the payoff assumptions and remain to be tested against observed shipping decisions.

Zitieren

APA

Meyer, Y. A., Oliveira, R. H. D. D., Terossi, P. C., Lassoued, R., Delboni, R. R., Reis, J. G. M. D., Chinelatto, V. H. F., & Galam, S. (2026). Evolutionary Game-Theory for Decision Making in Maritime Transport Under Multiple Contradictory Goals. Entropy, 28(11), 1244. https://doi.org/10.3390/e28111244

Vancouver

Meyer YA, Oliveira RHDD, Terossi PC, Lassoued R, Delboni RR, Reis JGMD, et al. Evolutionary Game-Theory for Decision Making in Maritime Transport Under Multiple Contradictory Goals. Entropy. 2026;28(11):1244. doi:10.3390/e28111244

BibTeX
@article{Meyer2026,
  author = {Meyer, Yuri Alexandre and Oliveira, Rafael Henrique de de and Terossi, Pedro Coelho and Lassoued, Rokaya and Delboni, Roberta Regina and Reis, João Gilberto Mendes dos and Chinelatto, Vivian Honorato Fonseca and Galam, Serge},
  title = {Evolutionary Game-Theory for Decision Making in Maritime Transport Under Multiple Contradictory Goals},
  journal = {Entropy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {28},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1244},
  doi = {10.3390/e28111244}
}
Kostenlos starten →