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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Does More Flexible Pricing Always Pay? Profit-Driven Pricing and Market Stability Under Platform Regulation

Le-Bin Wang, Jian Chai iD, Ying Yang

Entropy · 19.05.2026 · 28 (5) · 571

DOI: 10.3390/e28050571 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Entropy, online erschienen am 19.05.2026. Verfasst von Le-Bin Wang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xi'an 710126, China. Die Arbeit nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper studies a dynamic price adjustment system in platform markets, where sellers continuously revise prices, and examines its implications for market stability. We develop a platform-led discrete-time Stackelberg game model to describe the evolution of sellers’ prices and price adjustment speeds under bounded rationality. Unlike previous studies that treat adjustment speed as exogenous, we model it as an endogenous state variable shaped by profit incentives, behavioral inertia, and price fluctuations. We derive the interior symmetric equilibrium and show that profit-driven acceleration increases sellers’ adjustment speed. When this speed exceeds the stability threshold, the system may leave the stable region, causing bifurcations and complex dynamics. We then introduce a platform-imposed upper bound on adjustment speeds and demonstrate that appropriate regulation can restore stability while balancing market responsiveness and efficiency. Numerical simulations illustrate that moderate acceleration improves profitability, whereas excessive acceleration can lead to low-profit regimes. Entropy-based metrics are used to quantify system complexity, and an entropy-triggered feedback-control mechanism is proposed to mitigate excessive volatility while maintaining flexibility. Overall, the study highlights the importance of governing adjustment dynamics rather than solely focusing on price levels.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

chaosdynamic complexityentropyplatform regulationprice competition

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xi'an 710126, China.

ORCID-Profile: Jian Chai

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Wang, L. B., Chai, J., & Yang, Y. (2026). Does More Flexible Pricing Always Pay? Profit-Driven Pricing and Market Stability Under Platform Regulation. Entropy, 28(5), 571. https://doi.org/10.3390/e28050571

Vancouver

Wang LB, Chai J, Yang Y. Does More Flexible Pricing Always Pay? Profit-Driven Pricing and Market Stability Under Platform Regulation. Entropy. 2026;28(5):571. doi:10.3390/e28050571

BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
  author = {Wang, Le-Bin and Chai, Jian and Yang, Ying},
  title = {Does More Flexible Pricing Always Pay? Profit-Driven Pricing and Market Stability Under Platform Regulation},
  journal = {Entropy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {28},
  number = {5},
  pages = {571},
  doi = {10.3390/e28050571}
}
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