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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

SAluMC: Thwarting Side-Channel Attacks via Random Number Injection in RISC-V

Shibo Dang iD, Yunlong Shao iD, Zhida Li iD, Adetokunbo Makanju iD, Thomas Aaron Gulliver iD

Entropy · 14.02.2025 · 27 (2) · 202

DOI: 10.3390/e27020202 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Entropy, online erschienen am 14.02.2025. Verfasst von Shibo Dang und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: College of Engineering and Computing Sciences, New York Institute of Technology, Vancouver, BC V5M 4X3, Canada. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: NYIT Vancouver.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

As processor performance advances, the cache has become an essential component of computer architecture. Moreover, the rapid digital transformation of daily life has resulted in electronic devices storing greater amounts of sensitive information. Thus, device users are becoming more concerned about the security of their personal information, so improving processor performance is no longer the sole priority. Hardware vulnerabilities are generally more difficult to detect and address compared to software viruses and related threats. A common technique for exploiting hardware vulnerabilities is through side-channel attacks. They can bypass software security to extract personal information directly from hardware components like the cache or registers. This paper introduces a novel architecture for the arithmetic logic unit (ALU) and associated memory controller (MC) based on the RISC-V microarchitecture to mitigate side-channel attacks. The proposed approach employs hardware-generated random numbers and has minimal design costs, negligible impact on the original system structure, seamless integration, and easy modification of internal components. Results are presented that show it is effective against side-channel attacks.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

RISC-V microarchitectureattack countermeasurerandom numberside-channel attack

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • College of Engineering and Computing Sciences, New York Institute of Technology, Vancouver, BC V5M 4X3, Canada.
  • Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2, Canada.

ORCID-Profile: Shibo Dang, Yunlong Shao, Zhida Li, Adetokunbo Makanju, Thomas Aaron Gulliver

Förderung

  • NYIT Vancouver

Zitieren

APA

Dang, S., Shao, Y., Li, Z., Makanju, A., & Gulliver, T. A. (2025). SAluMC: Thwarting Side-Channel Attacks via Random Number Injection in RISC-V. Entropy, 27(2), 202. https://doi.org/10.3390/e27020202

Vancouver

Dang S, Shao Y, Li Z, Makanju A, Gulliver TA. SAluMC: Thwarting Side-Channel Attacks via Random Number Injection in RISC-V. Entropy. 2025;27(2):202. doi:10.3390/e27020202

BibTeX
@article{Dang2025,
  author = {Dang, Shibo and Shao, Yunlong and Li, Zhida and Makanju, Adetokunbo and Gulliver, Thomas Aaron},
  title = {SAluMC: Thwarting Side-Channel Attacks via Random Number Injection in RISC-V},
  journal = {Entropy},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {27},
  number = {2},
  pages = {202},
  doi = {10.3390/e27020202}
}
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