An Incentive-Compatible Semi-Parallel Proof-of-Work Protocol
Cryptography · 31.10.2026 · 10 (6) · 80
DOI: 10.3390/cryptography10060080 ↗Kurz gefasst
Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift Cryptography, online erschienen am 31.10.2026. Verfasst von Mustafa Doger und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Parallel Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocols have been suggested in the literature to improve the safety guarantees, transaction throughput, and confirmation latencies of Nakamoto consensus. In this work, we first consider the existing parallel PoW protocols and develop hard-coded incentive attack structures. Our theoretical results and simulations show that the existing parallel PoW protocols are more vulnerable to incentive attacks than Nakamoto consensus, e.g., attacks have a smaller profitability threshold, and they result in higher relative rewards. Next, we introduce a semi-parallel PoW protocol that outperforms both Nakamoto consensus and the existing parallel PoW protocols from most practical perspectives such as communication overheads, throughput, transaction conflicts, incentive compatibility of the protocol, as well as a fair distribution of transaction fees among the voters and the leaders. We use state-of-the-art analysis to evaluate the consistency of the protocol and consider Markov decision process (MDP) models to substantiate our claims about the resilience of our protocol against incentive attacks.
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APA
Doger, M., & Ulukus, S. (2026). An Incentive-Compatible Semi-Parallel Proof-of-Work Protocol. Cryptography, 10(6), 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography10060080
Vancouver
Doger M, Ulukus S. An Incentive-Compatible Semi-Parallel Proof-of-Work Protocol. Cryptography. 2026;10(6):80. doi:10.3390/cryptography10060080
BibTeX
@article{Doger2026,
author = {Doger, Mustafa and Ulukus, Sennur},
title = {An Incentive-Compatible Semi-Parallel Proof-of-Work Protocol},
journal = {Cryptography},
year = {2026},
volume = {10},
number = {6},
pages = {80},
doi = {10.3390/cryptography10060080}
}
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