EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A No-Degradation Framework for Augmenting Operating-System Randomness with Publicly Observable Dynamic Data Sources

Mohammad Dashti

Cryptography · 18.07.2026 · 10 (4) · 51

DOI: 10.3390/cryptography10040051 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Cryptography, online erschienen am 18.07.2026. Verfasst von Mohammad Dashti. Die Arbeit nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Modern cryptography depends on the quality of the operating-system entropy pool, and historic failures of that pool have shown that randomness, not algorithm strength, is often the weakest link of a deployed cryptosystem. Hardware True-Random Number Generators (TRNGs) mitigate this risk but are not universally available or trusted. This paper develops a unified four-stage construction, extract → condition → mix → derive, that admits heterogeneous publicly observable dynamic data sources as auxiliary inputs to the operating-system randomness pipeline. The construction’s central claim is a no-degradation defence-in-depth property, formalised as Theorem 1: under a pseudorandom-function assumption on the conditioning function, the composed output is computationally indistinguishable from the operating-system output alone, even when an adversary fully controls the public source. The framework does not claim that public sources supply secret entropy against an adversary who also observes them; it claims only that mixing them in cannot weaken the baseline, and that any uncompromised source supplies residual unpredictability under operating-system-generator compromise. We instantiate the framework in three pipelines—aircraft state vectors from a public sensor network, webcam frame-differencing of a wall of lava lamps, and computer-vision tracking of vehicles on a public traffic-camera feed—and argue soundness by combining the theorem with published evaluations of each source. On a 381 kbit corpus of framework-derived keys, every applicable NIST SP 800-22 test and SP 800-90B entropy estimator finds the framework output statistically indistinguishable from an os.urandom baseline; this is consistent with no-degradation but not in itself evidence of marginal entropy gain, and per-pipeline raw-input measurements and source-ablation runs are deferred to empirical follow-up. Off-the-shelf computer-vision tooling is sufficient to operationalise the framework on commodity hardware.

Zitieren

APA

Dashti, M. (2026). A No-Degradation Framework for Augmenting Operating-System Randomness with Publicly Observable Dynamic Data Sources. Cryptography, 10(4), 51. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography10040051

Vancouver

Dashti M. A No-Degradation Framework for Augmenting Operating-System Randomness with Publicly Observable Dynamic Data Sources. Cryptography. 2026;10(4):51. doi:10.3390/cryptography10040051

BibTeX
@article{Dashti2026,
  author = {Dashti, Mohammad},
  title = {A No-Degradation Framework for Augmenting Operating-System Randomness with Publicly Observable Dynamic Data Sources},
  journal = {Cryptography},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {10},
  number = {4},
  pages = {51},
  doi = {10.3390/cryptography10040051}
}
Kostenlos starten →