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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Large Pages, Large Leaks? Hugepage-Induced Side-Channels vs. Performance Improvements in Cryptographic Computations

Xinyao Li, Akhilesh Tyagi

Cryptography · 30.12.2025 · 10 (1) · 3

DOI: 10.3390/cryptography10010003 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Cryptography, online erschienen am 30.12.2025. Verfasst von Xinyao Li und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Side-channel attacks leveraging microarchitectural components such as caches and translation lookaside buffers (TLBs) pose increasing risks to cryptographic and machine-learning workloads. This paper presents a comparative study of performance and side-channel leakage under two page-size configurations—standard 4 KB pages and 2 MB huge pages—using paired attacker–victim experiments instrumented with both Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) counters and precise per-access timing using rdtscp(). The victim executes repeated, key-dependent memory accesses across eight cryptographic modes (AES, ChaCha20, RSA, and ECC variants) while the attacker records eight PMU features per access (cpu-cycles, instructions, cache-references, cache-misses, etc.) and precise rdtscp() timing. The resulting traces are analyzed using a multilayer perceptron classifier to quantify key-dependent leakage. Results show that the 2 MB huge-page configuration achieves a comparable key-classification accuracy (mean 0.79 vs. 0.77 for 4 KB) while reducing average CPU cycles by approximately 11%. Page-index identification remains near random chance (3.6–3.7% for PMU side-channels and 1.5% for timing side-channel), indicating no increase in measurable leakage at the page level. These findings suggest that huge-page mappings can improve runtime efficiency without amplifying observable side-channel vulnerabilities, offering a practical configuration for balancing performance and security in user-space cryptographic workloads.

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APA

Li, X., & Tyagi, A. (2025). Large Pages, Large Leaks? Hugepage-Induced Side-Channels vs. Performance Improvements in Cryptographic Computations. Cryptography, 10(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography10010003

Vancouver

Li X, Tyagi A. Large Pages, Large Leaks? Hugepage-Induced Side-Channels vs. Performance Improvements in Cryptographic Computations. Cryptography. 2025;10(1):3. doi:10.3390/cryptography10010003

BibTeX
@article{Li2025,
  author = {Li, Xinyao and Tyagi, Akhilesh},
  title = {Large Pages, Large Leaks? Hugepage-Induced Side-Channels vs. Performance Improvements in Cryptographic Computations},
  journal = {Cryptography},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {3},
  doi = {10.3390/cryptography10010003}
}
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