PowerTrip: Characterizing Ransomware Through Software-Accessible Power Side Channels
Computers · 16.11.2026 · 15 (11) · 838
DOI: 10.3390/computers15110838 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Computers, online erschienen am 16.11.2026. Verfasst von Tarun Aditya Kusupati und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Crypto-ransomware remains a major cybersecurity threat because it encrypts victim data and pressures organizations to pay for recovery. The existing defenses largely rely on software-visible indicators such as file system behavior, system calls, or process activity. These signals are useful, but they can be weakened by using different encryption algorithms or modes of operation or low-rate encryption strategies that reduce observable behavioral bursts. This paper investigates whether software-accessible power telemetry can provide an additional signal for detecting ransomware-like cryptographic activity. We monitor CPU energy through Intel’s Running Average Power Limit (RAPL) interface and GPU board power through nvidia-smi. Rather than executing live ransomware, we use controlled OpenSSL-based encryption workloads that reproduce the dominant computational phase of crypto-ransomware: sustained bulk encryption over diverse file types. This design enables safe, reproducible, and policy-compliant evaluation while isolating the power signature of repeated cryptographic computation. Across controlled, exploratory, and streaming experiments, the results show that encryption-heavy workloads produce distinguishable statistical and temporal power signatures even under concurrent benign activity. File type, algorithm-level, and mixed-activity analyses show that power traces encode workload structure and an MLP-based detector can separate ransomware-like encryption from benign tasks with useful accuracy. The reported streaming replay used the exploratory model’s 25-sample observation window (approximately 0.25 s of acquisition at 100 Hz); no optimal observation window length was established. We implemented a power telemetry detector and evaluated temporal alert policies; downstream behavioral confirmation and containment remain proposed components. An extended alert policy analysis reveals substantial false positive exposure at some settings and reduced sensitivity to low-duty-cycle encryption, motivating corroboration by independent host behavior. Operational deployment should therefore pair power-based alerts with orthogonal behavioral confirmation. Overall, software-accessible power telemetry offers a complementary endpoint signal without requiring external power probes, although runtime overhead and end-to-end containment effectiveness remain to be evaluated.
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APA
Kusupati, T. A., & Arefin, S. E. (2026). PowerTrip: Characterizing Ransomware Through Software-Accessible Power Side Channels. Computers, 15(11), 838. https://doi.org/10.3390/computers15110838
Vancouver
Kusupati TA, Arefin SE. PowerTrip: Characterizing Ransomware Through Software-Accessible Power Side Channels. Computers. 2026;15(11):838. doi:10.3390/computers15110838
BibTeX
@article{Kusupati2026,
author = {Kusupati, Tarun Aditya and Arefin, Sayed Erfan},
title = {PowerTrip: Characterizing Ransomware Through Software-Accessible Power Side Channels},
journal = {Computers},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {11},
pages = {838},
doi = {10.3390/computers15110838}
}
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