EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

PACE: A Page-Adaptive, Cache-Anchored Memory Encryption Engine for RISC-V with Formally Verified nth-Order DPA Resistance

Jyotiprakash Mishra, Sanjay K. Sahay, Swati Mishra, Aman Pathak

Chips · 07.08.2026 · 5 (3) · 25

DOI: 10.3390/chips5030025 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chips, online erschienen am 07.08.2026. Verfasst von Jyotiprakash Mishra und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Main memory carries data outside the processor’s trust boundary, so commodity systems-on-chip (SoCs) increasingly encrypt it; yet, in-line memory encryption engine itself becomes a differential power analysis (DPA) target whose key, if recovered, unlocks all of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). We present PACE, a page-adaptive, cache-anchored memory encryption engine for RISC-V that makes nth-order DPA resistance practical and keeps cryptographic latency off the cache eviction critical path. PACE inserts a TileLink adapter between the last-level cache and the memory port and applies, per physical page, one of four policies (plaintext/confidentiality/confidentiality+integrity/+masking-order-d) selected from RISC-V page table bits through a memory-mapped control plane. Confidentiality uses counter mode whose per-line keystream is precomputed during cache residency; integrity is tree-free at the embedded operating point via on-chip counters and tags, with a live split counter block-MAC Bonsai Merkle tree for scale-out. DPA resistance is layered: ISAP-style fresh re-keying caps the data complexity per key at q≈1, and domain-oriented masking (DOM, d + 1 shares) protects the sole key processing block to order d. We implement PACE in Chisel on a Rocket SoC (Chipyard) and evaluate it with open-source tooling. A deterministic TileLink-level harness proves ciphertext-in-memory and detects tamper/replay/splice, and the live Tier-B engine (DRAM counters and per-line message authentication codes (MACs) plus an on-chip-rooted block-MAC tree) is validated from end to end on full Rocket and BOOM SoCs and on the FPGA; the masked Ascon-p S-box is proven order-d secure (d = 1, 2) under a glitch- and transition-aware model by three independent formal tools (COCO, PROLEAD, and SILVER, the last also deciding the full composability lattice and confirming exact glitch-robust order-2 probing security), with COCO extending the exact verdict to the highest synthesized order d = 3 (secure at probing orders 1–3); a simulated trace correlation power analysis (CPA) recovers the full key from an unprotected core and is defeated by masking, with a mutual information analysis confirming the N∝σ2(d+1) trace amplification law. We further realize PACE on field-programmable gate array (FPGA) silicon: the engine plus an on-chip ring oscillator power sensor is placed, routed, timing-closed at 100 MHz, and programmed on a Xilinx XC7Z020, and we drive a fixed-vs-random Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) campaign read back entirely over a JTAG (Joint Test Action Group). A multi-core configuration and a Linux control-plane driver are likewise validated. Across synthetic access patterns and named application kernels (AES, SHA-256, matrix multiplication, pointer chasing) on both in-order Rocket and out-of-order BOOM, application-level overhead is within measurement noise of plaintext for cache resident workloads (masking, in particular, is cycle-identical to plain confidentiality), and we characterize the cost of each policy, masking order, and re-keying interval, demonstrating side-channel-hardened memory encryption on open RISC-V hardware.

Zitieren

APA

Mishra, J., Sahay, S. K., Mishra, S., & Pathak, A. (2026). PACE: A Page-Adaptive, Cache-Anchored Memory Encryption Engine for RISC-V with Formally Verified nth-Order DPA Resistance. Chips, 5(3), 25. https://doi.org/10.3390/chips5030025

Vancouver

Mishra J, Sahay SK, Mishra S, Pathak A. PACE: A Page-Adaptive, Cache-Anchored Memory Encryption Engine for RISC-V with Formally Verified nth-Order DPA Resistance. Chips. 2026;5(3):25. doi:10.3390/chips5030025

BibTeX
@article{Mishra2026,
  author = {Mishra, Jyotiprakash and Sahay, Sanjay K. and Mishra, Swati and Pathak, Aman},
  title = {PACE: A Page-Adaptive, Cache-Anchored Memory Encryption Engine for RISC-V with Formally Verified nth-Order DPA Resistance},
  journal = {Chips},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {25},
  doi = {10.3390/chips5030025}
}
Kostenlos starten →