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Bargaining and Pricing in Recycling Supply Chains for Construction and Demolition Waste as a Substrate

Jiaqi Lei, Huixin Chen, Xingwei Li

Buildings · 22.05.2026 · 16 (11) · 2061

DOI: 10.3390/buildings16112061 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Buildings, online erschienen am 22.05.2026. Verfasst von Jiaqi Lei und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 94 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The high-value utilization of construction and demolition waste is critical for sustainable development in the building sector. However, in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling supply chains, existing studies lack a systematic analysis of pricing mechanisms for such recycled CDW as substrate products, particularly regarding interest coordination and the quantification of green value. To reveal the bargaining mechanism between farmers as recyclers and processors and supermarkets as retailers under an asymmetric bargaining structure, this study applies Nash bargaining theory to construct a dynamic game model. The study revealed that (1) when the green degree of a product reaches a certain level, it can obtain a sustainable market premium and create a stable income space for both parties. (2) The relative strength of the bargaining power between the two sides significantly affects the impact of market base scale changes on profit distribution. When the bargaining power of the supermarket is lower than the threshold and the bargaining power of the farmers is higher than the threshold, the difference in profit between the farmers and the supermarket is negatively correlated with the market base scale of the CDW as a substrate. (3) The green sensitivity level of consumers affects the difference in profit of the main body with the government subsidy to farmers. This level is determined by the value of the green sensitivity coefficient of consumers and presents a differentiated adjustment effect in different value ranges, which in turn affects the transmission direction of government subsidies to profit distribution. (4) When the green sensitivity coefficient and the green communication intensity of farmers and the investment level are lower than the corresponding critical values, the difference in social welfare with or without subsidies is positively correlated with the amount of the subsidy. This study provides decision support for farmers and supermarkets in designing rational bargaining strategies and offers insights for improving coordination and sustainability in construction and demolition waste recycling supply chains.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Lei, J., Chen, H., & Li, X. (2026). Bargaining and Pricing in Recycling Supply Chains for Construction and Demolition Waste as a Substrate. Buildings, 16(11), 2061. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings16112061

Vancouver

Lei J, Chen H, Li X. Bargaining and Pricing in Recycling Supply Chains for Construction and Demolition Waste as a Substrate. Buildings. 2026;16(11):2061. doi:10.3390/buildings16112061

BibTeX
@article{Lei2026,
  author = {Lei, Jiaqi and Chen, Huixin and Li, Xingwei},
  title = {Bargaining and Pricing in Recycling Supply Chains for Construction and Demolition Waste as a Substrate},
  journal = {Buildings},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {16},
  number = {11},
  pages = {2061},
  doi = {10.3390/buildings16112061}
}
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