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Leader-Selection Mechanisms and Matching Protocols in Public Goods Games: Evidence from the Laboratory

Dongsheng Chen iD, Jing Liu iD, Wenhao Zhang iD, Jie Zheng iD

Behavioral Sciences · 03.08.2026 · 16 (8) · 1333

DOI: 10.3390/bs16081333 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Behavioral Sciences, online erschienen am 03.08.2026. Verfasst von Dongsheng Chen und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Business School, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411100, China. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Shandong Province Natural Science Foundation.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Using a controlled online laboratory experiment, we investigate how leader-selection rules influence public goods provision under fixed matching and random rematching. In our design, a leader is a first mover who chooses a contribution before the other group members, and this contribution is revealed to the later mover(s) before they make their own decisions. In leaderless groups, all group members choose their contributions simultaneously, so no member observes another member’s contribution before deciding. Leadership does not produce a uniform increase in contributions. Among the mechanisms examined, delegated leadership by a randomly selected candidate (DL-RC) exhibited the lowest overall mean contribution, particularly under random rematching; however, the primary analyses did not establish a statistically significant general mechanism effect. Within VL-RC, the accepted one-leader branch exhibited higher observed contributions than the refusal-contingent leaderless branch; within DL-RC, the accepted one-leader branch exhibited higher observed contributions than the refusal-contingent three-first-mover branch. Because these realized branches are generated by candidates’ acceptance decisions, the comparisons are conditional and do not identify causal effects of acceptance, refusal, leader absence, or the number of first movers. Across leader-present states, later-mover contributions were positively associated with the observed mean contribution of the first mover(s). Fixed matching yielded a higher observed mean contribution than random rematching, but the pooled difference was not statistically significant; the clearest differences in matching protocols arose in DL-RC.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

controlled online laboratory experimentcooperationleadershippublic goodssignaling

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Business School, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411100, China.
  • Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China.

ORCID-Profile: Dongsheng Chen, Jing Liu, Wenhao Zhang, Jie Zheng

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Shandong Province Natural Science Foundation

Zitieren

APA

Chen, D., Liu, J., Zhang, W., & Zheng, J. (2026). Leader-Selection Mechanisms and Matching Protocols in Public Goods Games: Evidence from the Laboratory. Behavioral Sciences, 16(8), 1333. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs16081333

Vancouver

Chen D, Liu J, Zhang W, Zheng J. Leader-Selection Mechanisms and Matching Protocols in Public Goods Games: Evidence from the Laboratory. Behavioral Sciences. 2026;16(8):1333. doi:10.3390/bs16081333

BibTeX
@article{Chen2026,
  author = {Chen, Dongsheng and Liu, Jing and Zhang, Wenhao and Zheng, Jie},
  title = {Leader-Selection Mechanisms and Matching Protocols in Public Goods Games: Evidence from the Laboratory},
  journal = {Behavioral Sciences},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {16},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1333},
  doi = {10.3390/bs16081333}
}
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