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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Balancedness and Core of Stochastic Cooperative Games with Proportional Distributions

Panfei Sun, Yichen Yang, Dongshuang Hou

Axioms · 09.06.2026 · 15 (6) · 429

DOI: 10.3390/axioms15060429 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Axioms, online erschienen am 09.06.2026. Verfasst von Panfei Sun und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Key R&D Program of China, Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper studies the balancedness and core properties of stochastic cooperative games under proportional distribution mechanisms. Different from decomposed payoff structures in the existing literature, where individual payoffs are separated into deterministic and stochastic components, we consider a restricted allocation environment in which each player’s payoff is a fixed proportional share of the realized stochastic coalition payoff. This proportional allocation rule is relevant for institutional settings where exposure shares are determined ex ante and cannot be adjusted after uncertainty is realized. Under homogeneous preference structures, we employ expectation–variance and quantile-based evaluation criteria to transform random coalition outcomes into comparable deterministic indices. We show that, under the proportional distribution mechanism, the equivalence between balancedness and core non-emptiness is not unconditional. Rather, it can be recovered only under additional structural assumptions, especially homogeneous preferences and positivity of evaluated coalition values. These results clarify the boundary under which fixed proportional sharing can support stable cooperation in stochastic cooperative games.

Förderung

  • National Key R&D Program of China
  • Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation

Zitieren

APA

Sun, P., Yang, Y., & Hou, D. (2026). Balancedness and Core of Stochastic Cooperative Games with Proportional Distributions. Axioms, 15(6), 429. https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms15060429

Vancouver

Sun P, Yang Y, Hou D. Balancedness and Core of Stochastic Cooperative Games with Proportional Distributions. Axioms. 2026;15(6):429. doi:10.3390/axioms15060429

BibTeX
@article{Sun2026,
  author = {Sun, Panfei and Yang, Yichen and Hou, Dongshuang},
  title = {Balancedness and Core of Stochastic Cooperative Games with Proportional Distributions},
  journal = {Axioms},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {15},
  number = {6},
  pages = {429},
  doi = {10.3390/axioms15060429}
}
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