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Pob-CFR: A Population-Based Counterfactual Regret Minimization Approach for Strategy Optimization in Two-Player Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games

Lei Zhang, Dingzhong Cai, Xuan Wang

Applied Sciences · 05.06.2026 · 16 (11) · 5711

DOI: 10.3390/app16115711 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Applied Sciences, online erschienen am 05.06.2026. Verfasst von Lei Zhang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Sequentialdecision-making under imperfect information is naturally modeled as an extensive-form game, where the Nash equilibrium serves as the predominant solution concept for two-player zero-sum settings. Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a widely used framework for this purpose, iteratively reducing regret through regret matching so that the average strategy approaches a Nash equilibrium. However, the convergence efficiency of CFR remains a practical challenge. In this work, we refine and reformulate an advantage-based exponential weighting scheme, Exponential CFR (ExpCFR), which accelerates convergence by allocating greater attention to highly profitable actions during the regret-accumulation process. Building on this heuristic, we further introduce Pob-CFR, a framework that integrates population-based evolutionary training with CFR. Pob-CFR maintains a diverse population of heterogeneous CFR variants, periodically evaluating them by exploitability and replacing underperforming individuals with the elite to synchronize strategy exploration. Systematic evaluations across five benchmark games demonstrate that these methods accelerate early-to-mid convergence compared to standard CFR baselines. Furthermore, within the evaluated benchmarks, the relative advantage of the population-based architecture appears more evident in the games with larger strategic complexity.

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APA

Zhang, L., Cai, D., & Wang, X. (2026). Pob-CFR: A Population-Based Counterfactual Regret Minimization Approach for Strategy Optimization in Two-Player Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games. Applied Sciences, 16(11), 5711. https://doi.org/10.3390/app16115711

Vancouver

Zhang L, Cai D, Wang X. Pob-CFR: A Population-Based Counterfactual Regret Minimization Approach for Strategy Optimization in Two-Player Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games. Applied Sciences. 2026;16(11):5711. doi:10.3390/app16115711

BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
  author = {Zhang, Lei and Cai, Dingzhong and Wang, Xuan},
  title = {Pob-CFR: A Population-Based Counterfactual Regret Minimization Approach for Strategy Optimization in Two-Player Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games},
  journal = {Applied Sciences},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {16},
  number = {11},
  pages = {5711},
  doi = {10.3390/app16115711}
}
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