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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A Risk-Aware Supply Function Nash Equilibrium Framework for Strategic Bidding in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets

Muhammad Muzammal Islam, Tianyou Yu, Massimo La Scala, Sergio Bruno, Ziqiang Wang, Cosimo Iurlaro, Andrea Altamura

Algorithms · 09.08.2026 · 19 (8) · 658

DOI: 10.3390/a19080658 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Algorithms, online erschienen am 09.08.2026. Verfasst von Muhammad Muzammal Islam und 6 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Strategic bidding in day-ahead electricity markets requires generation companies to maximize expected profits while managing financial risks arising from market uncertainty and competitors’ strategic behavior. This paper proposes a game-theoretic risk-aware strategic bidding framework based on a Supply Function Nash Equilibrium (SFNE) for dominant market operators in a uniform-pricing day-ahead market. Each operator strategically determines cluster-level bidding markups for its heterogeneous generation portfolio while anticipating competitors’ strategies. Demand uncertainty is represented by a finite scenario set, and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) of profit shortfall is incorporated into each operator’s expected-profit objective. The resulting non-cooperative equilibrium is solved using a relaxed Nikaido–Isoda (NI) best-response algorithm with convergence criteria based on the relative NI gap, strategy variation, and utility variation. The framework is validated using publicly available Italian day-ahead market offer data, where technology-oriented clustering reduces the strategic decision dimension while preserving portfolio heterogeneity. The proposed algorithm satisfies all convergence criteria within approximately 54 iterations. Numerical results show that the proposed risk-aware SFNE reduces aggregate downside-profit risk by approximately 7% compared with the risk-neutral SFNE while maintaining comparable expected profitability and slightly lowering market-clearing prices and procurement costs. A realistic 24 h market simulation further confirms the robustness and applicability of the proposed framework under time-varying market conditions. Overall, the proposed framework provides an economically interpretable and computationally tractable benchmark for risk-aware strategic bidding in day-ahead electricity markets.

Förderung

  • Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan

Zitieren

APA

Islam, M. M., Yu, T., Scala, M. L., Bruno, S., Wang, Z., Iurlaro, C., & Altamura, A. (2026). A Risk-Aware Supply Function Nash Equilibrium Framework for Strategic Bidding in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets. Algorithms, 19(8), 658. https://doi.org/10.3390/a19080658

Vancouver

Islam MM, Yu T, Scala ML, Bruno S, Wang Z, Iurlaro C, et al. A Risk-Aware Supply Function Nash Equilibrium Framework for Strategic Bidding in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets. Algorithms. 2026;19(8):658. doi:10.3390/a19080658

BibTeX
@article{Islam2026,
  author = {Islam, Muhammad Muzammal and Yu, Tianyou and Scala, Massimo La and Bruno, Sergio and Wang, Ziqiang and Iurlaro, Cosimo and Altamura, Andrea},
  title = {A Risk-Aware Supply Function Nash Equilibrium Framework for Strategic Bidding in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets},
  journal = {Algorithms},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {19},
  number = {8},
  pages = {658},
  doi = {10.3390/a19080658}
}
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