Conceptualizing moral health for military moral injury care: theoretical foundations of the moral engagement group
Frontiers in Psychiatry · 04.06.2026 · 17
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2026.1761744 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Psychiatry, online erschienen am 04.06.2026. Verfasst von Chris J Antal. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Chaplain Service, Corporal Michael J. Crescenz Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA, United States. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 46 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper presents the theoretical foundations of an existing intervention for moral injury (MI), the Moral Engagement Group (MEG) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ( 1 ). Previously, Antal et al. introduced the Moral Injury Group (MIG) as a "chaplain-psychologist collaboration" ( 2 ) and "community intervention" ( 3 ). MEG utilized the group protocol in the context of current controversies in military MI care ( 4 ). Cenker et al. reported positive group outcomes ( 5 ). The MIG is now called the MEG to better describe the group's purpose, and despite the name change, the protocol itself has not changed. The aim here is to articulate a coherent moral theory conceptualizing: (1) moral health and moral functioning; (2) MI as moral challenge (demands growth) not as a moral problem (demands fixing); (3) moral disengagement, moral exploitation, and moral overload as impairments not in individual functioning but rather as moral community functioning. Without conceptual clarity, figuring out thresholds for impairment remain elusive, and experts preoccupied on correct application of therapeutic technique to fix moral problems and improve individual functioning risk overlooking the vital role moral community plays in addressing moral challenges, and could sabotage moral health and moral functioning in the process.Drescher and Farnsworth stress MI investigators need to first "understand morality, including the contexts in which it operates and the social functions it serves" and offered "a social-functional perspective on morality and moral injury" ( 6 ), a theory also endorsed by Litz ( 7 ). Previously Antal et al. emphasized the importance of investigating contexts, including the context Herman called the "social ecology of violence" ( 8 ), from a public health perspective, to grasp the phenomenon called MI. Our focus here is a dimension of public health --moral health--which needs definition. For Settimo moral health "describes the impact that our moral behavior has on our own health" and consists of "the state of well-being that encompasses an individual's moral values, principles, and behavior, influenced by their neurobiological nature, emotions, and experiences, and impacting their overall physical and mental health" ( 9). This definition is a good start but overlooks the vital role of moral community. Talbert and Wolfendale offer "moral health should refer to the capacities, traits, and social conditions that make it possible for persons to act as moral agents, and to be regarded by others as such." They call this "the ability to participate in the moral community."The moral community is not a geographically bounded community. Rather, it is the community of persons who are appropriate objects of the reactive attitudes (emotions such as resentment and gratitude that are reactions to the quality of will expressed in others' behavior) and therefore regarded by themselves and others as morally responsible agents ( 10 ).A healthy moral community, then, is a community where one's moral agency is given appropriate moral regard by others and people experience, what Wolfendale calls moral security Broadly speaking, a person possesses subjective moral security when she believes that her basic interests and welfare will be accorded moral recognition by others in her community and by social, political, and legal institutions in her society. She possesses objective moral security if, as a matter of fact, her interests and welfare are regarded by her society as morally important-for example, when violent crimes against her are taken to warrant the same punishment and condemnation as equivalent crimes against others ( 11 ).Thus, moral health is not only "the state of well-being that encompasses an individual's moral values, principles, and behavior" described by Settimo. Moral health requires both the existence of, and the ability to participate in, the moral community where people are appropriate objects of the reactive attitudes, or moral emotions ( 12 ), where moral security is assured, and where people can recognize, appropriately engage with, and work through, moral challenges together. Settimo acknowledges the importance of community in moral repair yet fails to define moral health in a way that goes beyond individual well-being to include community. Achieving moral health as described above requires moral agents exhibit unimpaired moral functioning, an achievement that takes the intrapersonal and interpersonal work of moral engagement. The intrapersonal work includes cultivating moral literacy ( 13) and nurturing moral courage ( 14). The work of moral engagement includes exploring moral values (i.e., compassion, fairness, honesty, respect, responsibility) and moral emotions (i.e., gratitude, pride, disgust, resentment, guilt, indignation). A morally literate and morally courageous person has capacity to feel the range of pleasant and unpleasant moral emotions and rise to moral challenges. So it may be said that person exhibits unimpaired moral functioning and contributes to the moral security of others.The interpersonal work of moral engagement requires a moral agent to draw from the experience of moral emotions the motivation to act, providing others with appropriate moral regard. Practically speaking, this could mean saying "thank you" to express gratitude for praiseworthy behavior; and "I'm sorry," to express remorse for blameworthy behavior. Giving moral regard also includes accepting what Mellema calls moral accountability: acknowledging, where appropriate, personal complicity in, and accountability for, harmful actions they contribute to even though others may be the principal agents ( 15 ). Kutz calls this the Complicity Principle: "a person is accountable for what others do when he or she intentionally participates in the wrong they do or the harm they cause" ( 16).MI initially emerged to describe a particular kind of veteran experience, and the term has attracted much attention, from authors in multiple disciplines, with new applications, beyond the veteran population, to include first responders, healthcare workers, refugees, and others. Even so, the construct remains problematic and any discussion of it ought to begin with what Litz calls "epistemic humility" ( 17 ). Kinghorn named the risk of approaching MI as a clinical problem: moral injury beckons beyond the constraints of contemporary psychology toward something like moral theology. This something, embodied in specific communal practices, can rescue moral injury from the medical model and the means-end logic of techne and can allow for truthful contextualized narration of morally fragmenting combat experiences.These veterans need the support of a community that can listen, reflect, bear and grieve with them. … And they need a community that is willing to own and acknowledge its own violence, as embodied in the lives and actions of soldiers ( 18 ). Kinghorn's call to "rescue moral injury from the medical model" is echoed by Frame, who observes, "the field of moral injury has plainly been 'colonized' by psychology" ( 19 ). These authors seem to be arguing against an individualized medical model of disability and for something more grounded in a public health framework--a social model of disability. Here are the key differences:The medical model of disability is presented as viewing disability as a problem of the person, directly caused by disease, trauma, or other health condition which therefore requires sustained medical care provided in the form of individual treatment by professionals.The social model of disability sees the issue of "disability" as a socially created problem and a matter of the full integration of individuals into society. In this model, disability is not an attribute of an individual, but rather a complex collection of conditions, many of which are created by the social environment. Hence, the management of the problem requires social action and is the collective responsibility of society at large to make the environmental modifications necessary for the full participation of people with disabilities in all areas of social life. The Social Model of Disability asserts that individuals possess impairments, not disabilities ( 20 ).Approaching MI using the Social Model of Disability reframes MI from an attribute of an individual to a socially created, complex collection of conditions, created by the social environment. Approached in this way, MI is a public health challenge, and the phenomenon of MI requires not only individual care but also social action: society needs to share responsibility for the moral challenges and social conditions MI reveals. This approach supports veteran reintegration in a way that respects moral agency and facilitates moral health.A shift is underway, and presently, MI is widely understood as a bio-psycho-social-spiritual "problem," and some consensus has emerged about the value of inter-disciplinary collaboration that includes chaplains and spiritual leaders alongside therapists and others ( 21). As Hodgson and Carey note, some conceptualizations of MI tend to focus blame on the individual, effectively exonerating institutional and public liability for harmful consequences, and chaplain involvement has brought a needed shift in attention towards community engagement, public health, and shared moral responsibility ( 22). Early conceptualizations of MI have been clarified, with exposure to potentially morally injurious events (PMIEs), typically involving values transgressions by self or others, now distinguished from outcomes and impacts on individual functioning, as in the Moral Injury Outcome Scale ( 23). To help assess the severity of impact, Gosling et al. offers a Spectrum of Moral Harm ( 24), Grimell and Nilsson the Integrated Moral Distress and Injury Scale ( 25 ), and VaanderWeele et al. the Moral Trauma Spectrum ( 26). The DSM-5, while careful not to misrepresent moral problems as illnesses or disorders, now includes MI under the "Moral, Religious, or Spiritual Problem" Z code, with moral problems defined as "experiences that disrupt one's understanding of right and wrong, or sense of goodness of oneself, others or institutions" ( 27). Mattson et al. believe the new code "legitimizes an otherwise stigmatized and under-recognized aspect of human suffering, equipping both clinician and patient with necessary language" ( 28 ). Mattson et al. discuss The Moral Problem Framework (MPF) which they believe "defines moral dilemmas, distress, and injury in a sufficiently expansive way, to include the broad range of complex moral situations that could lead to morally laden distress. Mattson et al. see the new DSM Z code as progress, fitting MI along with moral dilemmas, and moral distress within the MPF, and assert MI as "inherently distressing and possibly impairing to individual functioning." Koenig et al. argue MI "is best conceptualized as a dimensional construct within a broader spectrum of moral trauma" ( 29 ).Even so, MI continues to be an emerging construct and maintaining an experimental mind-set when approaching MI seems imperative. et al. key the role of and as as severity and thresholds for impairment ( the the supports the of moral health offered The for moral that all moral not lead to In the MPF, the experience of moral of kind or be "moral moral distress, or moral trauma" is a necessary towards the "inherently morally distressing and possibly impairing to individual condition that Mattson et al. assert is MI. the other the MPF, by all MI under the of moral fails to the full range of moral challenges that rise to unpleasant moral emotions, that lead to something like "moral and contribute to impairments in moral functioning. In this way, the is not expansive equipping with necessary for the as moral approach the of the Z to which the people society the kind of collective harm that is military are morally responsible for that harm is a matter of as is the to which military who harm on of their society are morally responsible for their participation when state be or even and of moral responsibility for military for example, in more like the bear moral responsibility for state of even the public has and moral responsibility for not only the of or military but also for the in which the is or that is ( ). asserts the collective that it is that they will ( ). The of needs definition. For is harm caused by ( ). all military may not the of as defined by about the collective and of the harm of what is called MI. The at work people from and addressing collective that are moral challenges. Here the of moral and moral to and moral and they rise to an impairment in individual functioning call moral moral as the moral agents moral of of and of harmful and personal to harm and feel good about which the harm to ( ). and offer the but of moral exploitation, when moral agents with moral responsibility or moral arguing "the moral of soldiers as to moral injury and ( ). and also assert that in the context of an military are morally responsible not only for their personal in but also for the act of in a that is to be or which to their moral and moral or the the moral challenges of moral and moral people from moral with harmful of the of military who morally and morally others moral health and moral functioning. They moral They conditions where morally people who should and do feel unpleasant moral emotions emotions and into impairing and to moral health and moral functioning can and should be they and moral community the moral agent at risk of understood as "inherently distressing and possibly impairing to individual will in that moral community capacity to and bear unpleasant moral emotions to impairment or moral and moral should the unpleasant moral emotions of the morally person, like the in the of the moral challenges the community needs to to and moral agent with unimpaired moral functioning who a and morally will initially feel the challenge of a moral and experience unpleasant moral emotions, which may even moral a sense of or a "moral which lead to some kind of impairment in individual functioning, that some of with community and public health that moral agent the the social conditions of moral such as a moral community willing to own and acknowledge its own violence, that moral agent may by and in or resentment, the of responsibility by the emotions with such and that agent an impairment to individual functioning. A moral agent who more their share of responsibility for harmful moral that to others and experience unpleasant moral emotions to such a it some into that impairing to individual functioning includes an impairing to moral functioning, the moral overload ( ) to name this kind of this of impairment as MI seems to be within the of current on MI. to an impairment to individual functioning an impairment in moral functioning is an by the above of moral health and moral functioning. The state of in moral overload is both distressing and impairing to individual moral functioning. The state of moral overload not in a people in society unpleasant moral emotions by of moral or in moral exploitation, they and unpleasant moral emotions, to the harmful condition of moral MEG as the is a group by a chaplain and a with a community on the The MEG veterans and their community moral challenges to military The MEG community is a specific communal of moral the veterans are to ( ) to a community willing to share responsibility and own and acknowledge complicity in As should see themselves as responsibility for or their ( ) in the context of the people the have offered 18 veterans have the and people in In this way, the MEG has been the work of moral repair ( ), understood as moral health and moral functioning as described and or and in a shared sense of value and the the MEG has for moral by MI as an challenge ( ). To the et al. offer the of challenges and The the values people for and the that they current of capacity to values in their problem: that can be and within a by and problems are to and management of ( MEG not MI as a moral but as an moral challenge, the moral challenges when something morally is that moral problems when something morally wrong is that needs to be For moral problems defined do in the context of military and are the that rise to unpleasant moral can experience a range of moral challenges as as a range of unpleasant yet healthy moral emotions and exhibit unimpaired moral functioning. only a morally healthy person can a problem as a moral problem to begin with and to it with moral emotions, as requires possesses basic and traits, like moral and and a to a moral to a are unpleasant moral emotions, moral or something are the this of from the of a Model of and a veteran to a is a moral that the veteran needs to be with the application of some some from a public health the Social Model of and approaching MI as an challenge, in a way that moral emotions and responsibility for moral collective MI is an challenge is to MI is not a problem that can be and in a clinical with therapeutic from the people who to the conditions in which the the MEG in a medical and the chaplain and who are clinical they unpleasant moral emotions from is and veterans emotions to not as but as ( ). The MEG veterans into a of moral community which in the where veterans their about the and the moral emotions they bear of with the who share responsibility for conditions which rise to moral the of 12 the MEG veterans in the intrapersonal work of moral engagement, exploring moral values and moral emotions, their moral with moral as veterans in a where moral security is The MEG veterans in the interpersonal work of moral engagement the community which of the MEG veterans with their therapists and as as from the who are willing to share responsibility for harm or the To be this is not an approach where unimpaired veterans to help fix their MI. Rather, the approach in the including the chaplain and is with moral challenges and the only way to at moral health is and a of lead this the role of by about and their moral impact, and chaplains lead the community in a which includes and This moral community where moral emotions are moral values are and moral courage is This individual and collective for moral challenges together. is a community with moral express from moral of their and and with express of or their and to share responsibility for in the lives of veterans and in where veterans have and the of in and the of moral health and moral functioning offered can current conceptualizations of MI and assess their moral health, Talbert and Wolfendale "moral injury can when one's is when social conditions one's moral security and one's to be as an of the moral ( ). Talbert and Wolfendale challenge the of existing of by the range of possible moral challenges that can rise to impairments in moral are they to an impairing to moral functioning, or an impairing to physical or the above definition of moral functioning, when a moral agent not experience unpleasant moral emotions, even though emotions are an appropriate or not moral regard to others, or not moral even though the person may be in an impairment in moral functioning. the of appropriate moral is of moral functioning, is that moral functioning moral it as such challenges existing that regard MI as "inherently MI defined as the appropriate moral "moral and MI impairment is the key healthy moral functioning and what is is the impairment in the individual or the community MI defined as impairing to individual is not the same as impairing to moral functioning." Without a of moral health and moral functioning, current conceptualizations of MI could be morally and possibly harmful to moral "the moral dimension to is to the therapeutic and to moral by approaching psychology and as moral engagement ( Kinghorn offers is a of moral engagement and and for that moral in a morally and responsible ( could ap
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Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Chaplain Service, Corporal Michael J. Crescenz Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA, United States.
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APA
Antal, C. J. (2026). Conceptualizing moral health for military moral injury care: theoretical foundations of the moral engagement group. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 17. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2026.1761744
Vancouver
Antal CJ. Conceptualizing moral health for military moral injury care: theoretical foundations of the moral engagement group. Frontiers in Psychiatry. 2026;17. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2026.1761744
BibTeX
@article{Antal2026,
author = {Antal, Chris J},
title = {Conceptualizing moral health for military moral injury care: theoretical foundations of the moral engagement group},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychiatry},
year = {2026},
volume = {17},
doi = {10.3389/fpsyt.2026.1761744}
}
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