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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Depression as inferential rigidity: a meta-abductive account

Jian Sun, Li Jin

Frontiers in Psychology · 03.03.2026 · 17

DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1776494 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Psychology, online erschienen am 03.03.2026. Verfasst von Jian Sun und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Educational Science, Guangxi Minzu Normal University, Chongzuo, China. Die Arbeit nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Introduction

Depression is a highly prevalent mental disorder worldwide, and its cognitive rigidity—characterized by persistent negative beliefs resistant to countervailing evidence—remains a critical puzzle in philosophical psychiatry and clinical psychology. Existing theories of abductive reasoning have struggled to explain why similar adversities lead to rigid negative cognition in some individuals but adaptive coping in others.

Methods

Drawing on a hierarchical reconstruction of Peircean abduction, this study develops a three-layer model of depressive inferential pathology. The theoretical framework integrates insights from embodied cognition, existential phenomenology, and epistemic consequentialism to analyze the formal structure of depressive reasoning.

Results

The model identifies three interlocking inferential failures: (1) First-order pathology: Fixation of negatively self-referential abductive explanations, narrowing explanatory space; (2) Core pathology: Failure of meta-abduction, eliminating reflective revision of explanatory practices and cognitive adaptability; (3) Inferential extension: Rigid abductive conclusions are treated as absolute premises for destructive deductive reasoning, generating self-negating conclusions and closed ruminative loops. This model unifies clinical phenomena such as rumination and cognitive distortion, and clarifies the transition from situational responses to chronic pathology.

Discussion

The findings suggest that depressive cognitive rigidity stems not from negative belief content alone, but from structural defects in reasoning. Effective intervention should focus on restoring meta-abductive capacity—treating one’s own explanatory practices as revisable—complementing traditional approaches that target belief correction. This framework bridges philosophical psychiatry and clinical theory, offering a unified account of depression’s cognitive persistence and resistance to intervention.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

abductioncognitive rigiditydepressioninferential pathologymeta-abductionphilosophical psychiatryrumination

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Educational Science, Guangxi Minzu Normal University, Chongzuo, China.
  • School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.

Zitieren

APA

Sun, J., & Jin, L. (2026). Depression as inferential rigidity: a meta-abductive account. Frontiers in Psychology, 17. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1776494

Vancouver

Sun J, Jin L. Depression as inferential rigidity: a meta-abductive account. Frontiers in Psychology. 2026;17. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1776494

BibTeX
@article{Sun2026,
  author = {Sun, Jian and Jin, Li},
  title = {Depression as inferential rigidity: a meta-abductive account},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {17},
  doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1776494}
}
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