When deterrence redirects rather than resolves rivalry: a theory of recursive strategic transformation in conventional and nuclear competition
Frontiers in Political Science · 18.11.2026 · 8
DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2026.2018201 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Political Science, online erschienen am 18.11.2026. Verfasst von Ahmad Fares Albadareen. Die Arbeit nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Scholarship on deterrence typically evaluates success based on its prevention of unwanted action, yet comparatively little is explained about what happens to strategic rivalry the moment that action is deterred. This paper seeks to explain what happens after the success of deterrence. It argues that successful deterrence often redirects rather than resolves rivalry by altering the accessibility and cost of different strategic domains. As rivals reciprocally adapt to one another, the conflict undergoes a series of transformations. From these dynamics, this paper builds a bounded theory of Recursive Strategic Transformation (RST) for explaining how persistent rivalry evolves in the form of changing configurations within both conventional and nuclear-constrained environments. RST is organized around four constructs that are linked together in a causal sequence, leading to five falsifiable propositions regarding redirection, diversification, reciprocal co-adaptation, and configurational change. The theory is scoped to persistent interstate rivalries that have access to more than one domain of strategy. Two illustrations, including a stage-by-stage trace of U.S.–China semiconductor competition, show nuclear- and conventional-constrained pathways. The principal implication of this paper is that assessment of the effectiveness of deterrence should be made not just by whether it prevents an action, but also by how it reshapes what strategic rivalry will become next.
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APA
Albadareen, A. F. (2026). When deterrence redirects rather than resolves rivalry: a theory of recursive strategic transformation in conventional and nuclear competition. Frontiers in Political Science, 8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.2018201
Vancouver
Albadareen AF. When deterrence redirects rather than resolves rivalry: a theory of recursive strategic transformation in conventional and nuclear competition. Frontiers in Political Science. 2026;8. doi:10.3389/fpos.2026.2018201
BibTeX
@article{Albadareen2026,
author = {Albadareen, Ahmad Fares},
title = {When deterrence redirects rather than resolves rivalry: a theory of recursive strategic transformation in conventional and nuclear competition},
journal = {Frontiers in Political Science},
year = {2026},
volume = {8},
doi = {10.3389/fpos.2026.2018201}
}
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