Public choice, incentive structures, and the problems of democratic resilience
Frontiers in Political Science · 21.07.2026 · 8
DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2026.1887840 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Political Science, online erschienen am 21.07.2026. Verfasst von Paul Dragos Aligica und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper advances a public choice perspective on democratic resilience, in which resilience is understood as an emergent property of incentive structures, strategic behavior, and institutional constraints. By shifting the analytical focus to the actions of individuals operating within rules, public choice reconceptualizes democracy as a dynamic institutional order shaped by purposive actors. The paper develops two main contributions. First, it highlights the normative dimension of public choice, which grounds democratic legitimacy in normative individualism, voluntary agreement, and constitutional rules. From this standpoint, democratic resilience depends on the system’s capacity to preserve its foundational principles of consent, reciprocity, and rule-based cooperation. Second, the paper introduces the concept of the “negative facet of resilience,” showing how democratic systems may become resilient in ways that entrench inefficiency, distort representation, and block reform. Mechanisms such as rent-seeking, collective action asymmetries, bureaucratic expansion, and fiscal illusion generate self-reinforcing institutional equilibria that sustain dysfunction. These dynamics are illustrated through the case of the European Union, demonstrating how stability may coexist with democratic regression and institutional sclerosis.
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APA
Aligica, P. D., & Ciobanu, R. G. (2026). Public choice, incentive structures, and the problems of democratic resilience. Frontiers in Political Science, 8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1887840
Vancouver
Aligica PD, Ciobanu RG. Public choice, incentive structures, and the problems of democratic resilience. Frontiers in Political Science. 2026;8. doi:10.3389/fpos.2026.1887840
BibTeX
@article{Aligica2026,
author = {Aligica, Paul Dragos and Ciobanu, Robert Gabriel},
title = {Public choice, incentive structures, and the problems of democratic resilience},
journal = {Frontiers in Political Science},
year = {2026},
volume = {8},
doi = {10.3389/fpos.2026.1887840}
}
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