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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A side-channel attack for recovering keys in HMAC-SM3 algorithm

Zhen Wu, Zhiguang Qin, Kai Wang

Frontiers in Physics · 17.08.2026 · 14

DOI: 10.3389/fphy.2026.1927967 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Physics, online erschienen am 17.08.2026. Verfasst von Zhen Wu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Cyber-Physical-Social Systems (CPSS) face escalating side-channel threats that undermine secure data transmission and authentication. As China’s national cryptographic hash standard, SM3 is widely deployed in CPSS-integrated social network ecosystems for identity authentication, API signing, and cross-platform data integrity verification—yet its key-dependent input vulnerabilities against side-channel attacks remain inadequately addressed. This study tackles two critical limitations of traditional side-channel attacks for HMAC-SM3 key recovery: non-profiling methods fail due to absent plaintext correlations, while profiling-based approaches suffer from error accumulation and near-zero success rates in single-trace scenarios. We propose a self-calibrating side-channel attack (SC-SCA) that enables high-accuracy HMAC-SM3 key recovery using only a single power trace during the attack phase. The method constructs a Bayesian network to integrate power trace statistics with prior knowledge of input dependencies, then performs joint probabilistic inference via belief propagation. Experimental results demonstrate 100% key recovery success under simulated noiseless conditions, 91.45% success on a real smart card system, and 73% effectiveness at a 10 dB signal-to-noise ratio. Crucially, this work exposes a previously overlooked attack surface in CPSS-based social networks: a single compromised HMAC-SM3 key can enable forged device control commands, large-scale privacy breaches, and cascading identity theft across linked social platforms. Our findings provide both a practical security benchmark for CPSS edge devices and theoretical foundations for designing side-channel-resistant cryptographic implementations.

Zitieren

APA

Wu, Z., Qin, Z., & Wang, K. (2026). A side-channel attack for recovering keys in HMAC-SM3 algorithm. Frontiers in Physics, 14. https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2026.1927967

Vancouver

Wu Z, Qin Z, Wang K. A side-channel attack for recovering keys in HMAC-SM3 algorithm. Frontiers in Physics. 2026;14. doi:10.3389/fphy.2026.1927967

BibTeX
@article{Wu2026,
  author = {Wu, Zhen and Qin, Zhiguang and Wang, Kai},
  title = {A side-channel attack for recovering keys in HMAC-SM3 algorithm},
  journal = {Frontiers in Physics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  doi = {10.3389/fphy.2026.1927967}
}
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