Design and implementation of an authenticated post-quantum session protocol using ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and AES-256-GCM
Frontiers in Physics · 08.01.2026 · 13
DOI: 10.3389/fphy.2025.1723966 ↗Kurz gefasst
Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Physics, online erschienen am 08.01.2026. Verfasst von Akinlemi Olushola und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 81 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Introduction
Session establishment, the process by which two parties authenticate each other and derive a shared secret key, forms the foundation for secure digital communication. Quantum computers threaten this foundation by breaking classical public-key primitives such as RSA and elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH), thereby enabling harvest-now–decrypt-later (HNDL) attacks that endanger long-term confidentiality.
Methods
This paper presents the design, implementation, and evaluation of an authenticated, quantum-resistant session protocol that replaces these vulnerable mechanisms with their post-quantum counterparts. The proposed protocol integrates ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203; CRYSTALS, Kyber) for ephemeral key exchange, ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204; CRYSTALS, Dilithium) for endpoint authentication, and AES-256-GCM for symmetric protection. A transcript-bound HKDF–SHA3-256 key schedule and a 96-bit GCM nonce construction with conservative rekey limits are used to ensure forward secrecy, downgrade resistance, and message integrity. A Python/C prototype (PQClean ML-KEM-1024 with PyCryptodome AES-256-GCM) was benchmarked over 1,000 iterations on commodity hardware.
Results
The results show that sub-millisecond cryptographic overhead ML-KEM-1024 matches the performance of X25519 while vastly outperforming RSA-3072 in secure session establishment, and symmetric encryption remains cost effective. Nonces are unique 96-bit values, never reused across directions or beyond 2³² records, following NIST SP 800-38D; when nonce-misuse resistance is required, AES-256-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) is supported as a drop-in alternative. Empirical tests under both local and WAN-emulated ( ≈ 40 ms RTT) network conditions confirm that the additional post-quantum cost maintains the handshake cryptographic latency in the 0.50–0.70 ms range.
Discussion
These results demonstrate that fully authenticated, forward-secure, quantum-resistant session negotiation is practical for real-world deployments.
Zitieren
APA
Olushola, A., & Meenakshi, S. P. (2026). Design and implementation of an authenticated post-quantum session protocol using ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and AES-256-GCM. Frontiers in Physics, 13. https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2025.1723966
Vancouver
Olushola A, Meenakshi SP. Design and implementation of an authenticated post-quantum session protocol using ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and AES-256-GCM. Frontiers in Physics. 2026;13. doi:10.3389/fphy.2025.1723966
BibTeX
@article{Olushola2026,
author = {Olushola, Akinlemi and Meenakshi, S. P.},
title = {Design and implementation of an authenticated post-quantum session protocol using ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and AES-256-GCM},
journal = {Frontiers in Physics},
year = {2026},
volume = {13},
doi = {10.3389/fphy.2025.1723966}
}
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