MEV in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains
Frontiers in Blockchain · 18.06.2026 · 9
DOI: 10.3389/fbloc.2026.1782707 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Blockchain, online erschienen am 18.06.2026. Verfasst von Benjamin Marsh und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We analyze the maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of sequential chains and introduces new maximal extractable value (MEV) channels, including same-tick duplicate steals, proposer-to-proposer auctions, and timing races driven by proof of availability latency. We develop a hazard-normalized model of delay and inclusion, derive a closed-form delay envelope M ( τ ) , and characterize equilibria for censorship, duplication, and auction games. We show how deterministic priority directed acyclic graph (DAG) scheduling and duplicate-aware payouts neutralize same-tick MEV while preserving throughput, identifying simple protocol configurations to mitigate multiple concurrent proposer (MCP)-specific extraction without centralized builders.
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APA
Marsh, B., & Landers, S. (2026). MEV in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains. Frontiers in Blockchain, 9. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2026.1782707
Vancouver
Marsh B, Landers S. MEV in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains. Frontiers in Blockchain. 2026;9. doi:10.3389/fbloc.2026.1782707
BibTeX
@article{Marsh2026,
author = {Marsh, Benjamin and Landers, Steven},
title = {MEV in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains},
journal = {Frontiers in Blockchain},
year = {2026},
volume = {9},
doi = {10.3389/fbloc.2026.1782707}
}
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