Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponents on the Moral Sense
Journal of Scottish Philosophy · 2022-06 · 20 (2) · 143-161
DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2022.0330 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2022-06. Verfasst von Ruth Boeker. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 26 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration.
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APA
Boeker, R. (2022). Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponents on the Moral Sense. Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 20(2), 143-161. https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0330
Vancouver
Boeker R. Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponents on the Moral Sense. Journal of Scottish Philosophy. 2022;20(2):143-161. doi:10.3366/jsp.2022.0330
BibTeX
@article{Boeker2022,
author = {Boeker, Ruth},
title = {Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponents on the Moral Sense},
journal = {Journal of Scottish Philosophy},
year = {2022},
volume = {20},
number = {2},
pages = {143--161},
doi = {10.3366/jsp.2022.0330}
}
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