Justice And Resentment In Hume, Reid, And Smith
Journal of Scottish Philosophy · 2008
DOI: 10.3366/e1479665108000080 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2008. Verfasst von MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 4 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Adam Smith and Thomas Reid follow Joseph Butler's lead in discussing the moral significance of resentment in great detail. David Hume does not. For Smith and Reid, resentment reveals shortcomings in Hume's attempt to ground justice solely in terms of self-interest and public utility. This can be seen most clearly in Reid's critique of Hume's response to the sensible knave. Reid argues that Hume's appeal to our integrity can have force only if Hume concedes that there are elements of justice that are grounded in neither self-interest nor public utility.
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APA
PRITCHARD, M. S. (2008). Justice And Resentment In Hume, Reid, And Smith. Journal of Scottish Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.3366/e1479665108000080
Vancouver
PRITCHARD MS. Justice And Resentment In Hume, Reid, And Smith. Journal of Scottish Philosophy. 2008. doi:10.3366/e1479665108000080
BibTeX
@article{PRITCHARD2008,
author = {PRITCHARD, MICHAEL S.},
title = {Justice And Resentment In Hume, Reid, And Smith},
journal = {Journal of Scottish Philosophy},
year = {2008},
doi = {10.3366/e1479665108000080}
}
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